





The Draft Revised Restatement:t
A Critique From a Securities
Regulation Perspective
For the past several years, the American Law Institute has been preparing
a proposed revision of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States ("Draft Restatement"). This article is a critique
from a securities regulation perspective of the Draft Restatement's sections
402, 403, 416, 418, 419, 420 and 431.1 In short, the Draft Restatement
departs substantially from existing law. It would add dangerous vagueness
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Counsels, and Ms. Sullivan and Mr. Michael are Staff Attorneys, Office of General Counsel of
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the Office of the General Counsel and do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Commission or other members of the Commission staff. The
Commission has neither considered nor expressed any view on this article or the preceding
commentary.
This article is an adaptation of an earlier commentary prepared by the authors and presented
to the American Law Institute. Ira Paull, Esq., formerly of the Office of the General Counsel,
significantly contributed to that commentary.
tAMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED), hereinafter referred to as "Draft" or "Draft Restatement." Since 1980, five tenta-
tive drafts have been issued and the Draft Restatement is tentatively scheduled for completion
in May 1985. Reporters, for the project, prepared the various tentative drafts. The Chief
Reporter for the revision is Louis Henkin; the Associate Reporters are Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Louis B. Sohn and Detlev F. Vagts. The drafts have appeared since 1980 and have been
discussed and voted on annually by the membership, a group of approximately 1,800 eminent
practitioners, jurists and scholars.
1. DRAFT RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1981, and No. 3, 1982). Section 431 has been
renumbered Section 441, see id. at xxii (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1984). This article will refer to
Section 431, as set forth with notes and comments, in Tentative Draft No.3.
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and uncertainty to the jurisdictional analysis used to determine whether the
United States securities laws will be applied to transnational securities
activities. In particular, the complicated balancing inquiry required under
the Draft would increase litigation by introducing new issues into the juris-
dictional analysis and by removing the certainty created by past court
decisions. The Draft would make it substantially more difficult to apply
United States securities laws where their application is necessary, appropri-
ate and noncontroversial. In addition, the Draft's restrictions on access to
information located abroad could impair effective and even-handed en-
forcement of the securities laws. The Draft Restatement would also make it
more difficult for the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commis-
sion") to take summary action which may be necessary for the protection of
securities markets in the United States.
Section 1905 of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code
("Code"),2 by contrast, retains the benefits of current judicial analysis by
substantially codifying that reasoning, while eliminating the drawback of its
case-by-case development. Although Section 1905 of the Code was drafted
in the context of a general revision of the securities laws, it is a more accurate
and workable "restatement" of foreign relations law. The Code also fur-
thers the investor protection purposes of the securities laws because it takes
a broader view of the appropriate application of United States securities
laws than the Draft Restatement.
This article compares and contrasts the analysis used under current law
with the analysis that would be used under the Code and under the Draft
Restatement. Part I consists of a summary review of current judicial analysis
of application of United States law (subpart A), a comparison of that
analysis with that of the Code (subpart B) and the Draft Restatement
(subpart C) and illustrations of the differences using five examples (subpart
D). Part II sets forth our principal concerns about the Draft Restatement's
approach to application of United States law. Part III critically reviews the
Draft's approach to access to information located abroad and the judicial
and administrative enforcement mechanisms available to the Commission.
I. Securities Laws Under Current Judicial Analysis, The Federal Securities
Code and the Draft Restatement: A Comparison
Jurisdictional analyses under current law, the Code and the Draft Re-
statement share a common beginning. Each is based primarily on two major
principles of international law, the "effects" doctrine and the "conduct"
2. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1905 (1980) (hereinafter cited without further cross-reference
as the "Code").
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doctrine. Under the "effects" doctrine, it is permissible to apply United
States law if the acts involved had a substantial and foreseeable effect within
the United States.3 Under the "conduct" doctrine, United States law can be
applied if acts occurred in this country. 4 A third theory, application of
United States law with respect to United States nationals wherever located,
is generally disfavored.5
From that common starting point, the analyses diverge. Under the
approach currently employed by United States courts to determine the
applicability of United States securities law, the court first considers
whether application of our laws is permissable under the "conduct" or
"effects" principles of international law. If not, our laws will not be applied,
absent a clear expression of Congressional intent to the contrary. 6 If interna-
tional law would permit application of United States law, the court then
determines whether Congress intended our laws to apply to the particular
situation being considered.7 The Code provides clear answers to the full
range of jurisdictional inquiries, codifying the results of previous judicial
determinations. The Draft, in contrast, substitutes a "reasonableness"
analysis in most cases. 8 The following discussion examines the use of the
three fundamental jurisdictional principles of international law-effects,
conduct and nationality-as a basis for applying United States securities
laws to international activities under current law, the Code and the Draft
Restatement.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(b)
(1965) (current Restatement); see, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)(reh. on other grounds), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
Code § 1905(a)(1)(D)(ii); Draft Restatement § 402(1)(c).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17(a)
(1965) (current Restatement); see, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Code § 1905(a)(1)(D)(i); Draft Restatement § 402(1)(a).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30 (1965)
(current Restatement); see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 934-37 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting assertion of nationality as the "paramount" basis of
jurisdiction); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975) (see infra text accompanying note 78). "In general, territoriality ["effects" or
"conduct"] is considered the normal, and nationality the exceptional, basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction, though no state (and certainly not international law) rejects nationality as a basis
for jurisdiction .... Draft Restatement § 402 comment b; see also id. reporters' note 1 (citing
cases and statutes applying United States law based on nationality).
6. See, e.g., Leasco, 466 F.2d at 1334; Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
7. See, e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985.
8. Under the Draft, as under current law (see supra text accompanying note 6), the limita-
tions set by international law do not apply when Congress "ma[kes] clear its purpose" to apply
United States law beyond the limits of international law. Draft Restatement § 403(4)(b). In
order to illustrate the contrast between the Draft Restatement, on the one hand, and the Code
and present law, on the other, in this memorandum we have assumed the absence of a
Congressional intent to transcend international law.
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A. CURRENT JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
1. The "Effects" Doctrine
The seminal case applying9 United States securities law on the basis of
"effects" in this country is Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. 10 In Schoenbaum, an
American shareholder of a Canadian corporation, with stock listed on a
United States exchange, brought a derivative action against the company's
directors, alleging that the company's sale in Canada of treasury stock below
its true value violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.'' The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that the Act has no extraterritorial application, stating:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial
application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign
securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market
from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities. 12
The court held that "at least when the transactions involved stock registered
and listed on a national securities exchange," the impairment of the value of
the corporation's shares held by United States shareholders was a "suf-
ficiently serious effect upon United States commerce to warrant assertion of
jurisdiction for the protection of American investors."' ' 3
a. Effect on United States Citizens
The effects doctrine provides jurisdiction based on adverse effects on
United States citizens. In SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 14 the Ninth
Circuit held that the "impact of [defendant's] activities [carried out within
the United States] upon American investors" permitted application of
9. Although the courts frequently speak of the presence or absence of "jurisdiction" or
"subject-matter jurisdiction," this characterization is not strictly accurate. The securities laws
plainly confer subject matter jurisdiction on the United States district courts. See, e.g., § 22(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77v(a). If none of the securities laws apply in a given
case, however, a United States court may still have subject matter jurisdiction. It is possible that
the diversity standards of 28 U.S.C. 1332 or the requirements of some other jurisdictional
statute could be satisfied, even with foreign parties. In that event, a United States court could
still hear the case, but could not apply the United States securities laws. However, plaintiffs
typically sue in United States courts solely to seek the protections afforded by the relatively
strict United States securities laws; thus, if the court decides that those laws do not apply, it has,
as a practical matter, disposed of the case. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 414 n.5 (8th Cir. 1979); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015
(2d Cir. 1975) (discussing various bases of subject matter jurisdiction and holding inapplicable
all except those under the securities laws).
10. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (reh. on other grounds),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
11. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
12. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
13. Id. at 208, 209.
14. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
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United States antifraud law, without distinguishing between United States
citizens residing in this country and those residing abroad.15
Subsequently, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 16 the Second Circuit did
draw this distinction. The court held that no domestic conduct is necessary in
an antifraud action if resident citizens are affected, but where nonresident
United States citizens are affected, it is necessary for "significant activities,"
even if "merely preparatory," to occur in the United States.17
Similar theories have been used in application of the registration provi-
sions of the securities laws. The Commission requires registration of a
foreign public offering of a United States issuer which may never have any
effect in or contact with the United States (other than use of interstate or
foreign commerce or the mails), if the securities offered are "specifically
directed" to United States nonresident citizens.' 8 The Commission also
requires registration under the Securities Exchange Act of foreign broker-
dealers who sell United States securities, unless these sales are made "out-
side the jurisdiction of the United States to persons other than American
nationals." 19
15. Id. at 356-57.
16. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
17. Id. at 992, 993. For an analysis of those portions ofhhe Bersch case dealing with conduct
in the United States, see infra text accompanying notes 46-53.
18. Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964). No registration would be
required if the distribution of securities abroad "is made under circumstances reasonably
designed to preclude distribution or redistribution of the securities within, or to the nationals of,
the United States." Id. (emphasis added).
The issue of registration of foreign offers and sales arises because the registration provisions
of the Securities Act have very broad potential application. Section 5 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. 77e, makes unlawful the use of instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce, or the use of the mails, to offer, sell or deliver unregistered securities or to
deliver improper prospectuses. Section 2(7) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. 77b(7), defines "interstate
commerce" to include foreign commerce. Thus, it would be theoretically possible to require
registration under the Securities Act if a foreign issuer made an offer to someone momentarily
present in the United States. See United Financial Group, 474 F.2d at 357 (under this theory,
"[i]f accepted without qualification, there would be jurisdiction in every case regardless of
whether American investors were involved").
See also Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M. (No-action letter dated July 7, 1983) (no-action position
taken by the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance, based in part on foreign issuer's
representation that "offers and sales in the U.S. can be made only on a personal basis ... to
non-U.S. persons"); Israel Discount Bank Limited (No-action letter dated July 23, 1981)
(no-action position taken by the Division of Corporation Finance, based on foreign issuer's
representation that sales made in the United States would be made to nonresidents and
noncitizens present in the United States only on banking business, and that no offering circular
or advertising material would be distributed here).
19. Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964) (applying generally to any
distribution of American securities); see also Securities Act Release No. 5068, 35 Fed. Reg.
12,103, 12,105 (1970) (applying similar rule to distribution of shares of United States registered
open-end investment companies). The requirement regarding open-end investment companies
"supplements and is consistent with" the general requirement of Release No. 4708. Id.
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b. Effect on United States Markets
Foreign plaintiffs are of course generally unable to demonstrate that
transnational securities activities had an impact on American investors.
They can still utilize the effects doctrine, however, if there is an impact on
United States markets. For example, in Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 20 the
former shareholders of a Canadian corporation that merged into a United
States corporation claimed fraud in the transaction. The Ninth Circuit
upheld jurisdiction because the defendant was a United States corporation
with stock listed on a national securities exchange, and there was fraudulent
representation in the course of the takeover transaction, that the surviving
corporation's shares could be traded in the United States without registra-
tion, "proximately resulted in the collapse of th[at] American market"
injuring the company's shareholders.2 1 And, in ITT v. Cornfeld,22 involving
alleged fraud in a foreign investment trust's purchases in the European
after-market of eurodollar debentures issued by an American corporation's
foreign subsidiary, the Second Circuit found it significant that the securities
involved "in substance were American." 23 The court noted its belief that
"Congress would have been considerably more interested in assuring
against the fraudulent issuance of securities constituting obligations of
American rather than purely foreign business."
2 4
In determining whether to apply antifraud provisions based on effects in
this country, the courts have generally considered the presence or absence
of domestic trading, particularly exchange trading, to be a significant
factor.25 The courts usually look at trading generally; it is not important
where the particular securities transaction at issue in the case was
executed.26
20. 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
21. Contrary to that representation, registration in the United States was indeed required.
The market collapsed when the SEC sought and obtained an injunction suspending trading. Id.
at 135. While the plaintiff class allegedly included one United States citizen (see id. at 133 n. 1),
the Ninth Circuit did not rely on that factor.
22. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. Id. at 920; see also AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d
148, 153 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing Cornfeld holding).
24. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920.
25. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 417
n.12 (8th Cir. 1979) (mentioning absence of exchange listing in rejecting application of
"effects" test); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977)
(same); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (reh. on other grounds), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (supra text accompanying note
13) (effects found "at least when the transactions involved stock ... on a national securities
exchange").
26. However, in a case involving the similar antifraud provisions of the Commodity Ex-
change Act, one court has concluded that "where the challenged transactions involve trading on
domestic exchanges, harm can be presumed because the fraud alleged implicates the integrity
of the American market." Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 547 F. Supp. 309, 313
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In other cases, where no showing of harm or fraud is required, domestic
execution of the transaction at issue can be more important. For example, in
Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd. ,27 the Second Circuit applied the short-swing
trading provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 28 to
transactions by foreigners carried out on an American exchange. The court
noted that "the effect of this kind of insider trading is quite as great as when
the trader is an American." 29 But, in Wagman v. Astle, 30 a district court
refused to apply Section 16(b) to transactions carried out in Canada.
Although the Wagman decision rests on the court's failure to find personal
jurisdiction,3 1 the court also noted that there was "no actual effect in the
United States on which to base jurisdiction. 32
The effect on the United States securities markets alleged by a foreign
plaintiff must be somehow related to the allegedly unlawful acts. The effects
doctrine "does not support subject matter jurisdiction ... simply because in
the long run there was an adverse effect on this country's general economic
interests or on American security prices.",
33
2. The "Conduct" Doctrine
The principle that conduct in this country is a basis for applying our
nation's securities laws was established in Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp. v. Maxwell.34 Plaintiffs, a United States corporation and its
foreign subsidiary, alleged fraud in the subsidiary's purchase of shares of a
British corporation from British defendants. The Second Circuit was unwill-
(N.D. I1. 1982) (emphasis added), aff'd, 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984) ("the domestic
marketplace will be artificially influenced, and public confidence in the markets could be
undermined"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984).
27. 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
28. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. 77p(b), provides that an issuer may recover the profits an
officer, director, or ten-percent shareholder, made from any purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase, of the issuer's equity securities occurring within a six-month period.
29. Id. at 442.
30. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
31. The Wagman court did not reach the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, because it
found that the transaction lacked any contacts with the United States and dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 502. But in deciding the issue, the court looked to the same factors
as under the "effects" doctrine. Id. at 499-502.
32. Id. at 502. The court suggested that "[a] case can be imagined in which individual foreign
defendants come into, do business in, or knowingly cause an actual effect in this country, in
connection with a transaction which violates the provisions of § 16(b)." Id. at 502 n.6. This
seems to.describe the facts in Roth, where application of § 16(b) was upheld.
33. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989; see also SEC v. United Financial Group, 474 F.2d 354, 357 n.7
(9th Cir. 1973) (expressing no opinion on "the appropriateness of asserting jurisdiction on the
ground of a national interest in protecting this country's reputation abroad or on the ground
that the activities of the appellants have an adverse economic impact upon this country's
economy.").
34. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ing to extend the "effects" doctrine of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook35 to the
adverse effect on the American entity and its shareholders because the
securities, issuer and transaction were all predominantly foreign. The court
stated:
[We do not] believe that Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct
throughout the world in every instance where an American company bought or
sold a security. When no fraud has been practiced in this country and the purchase
or sale has not been made here, we would be hard pressed to find justification for
going beyond Schoenbaum.
36
Turning to the conduct that had occured in this country, however, the court
upheld application of United States antifraud law. First, based on the
current Restatement, 37 the court held that United States law may be applied
if conduct occurs within the United States. 38 It then reasoned that Congress
would have wished to protect a United States company and its shareholders
where "substantial representations were made in the United States."
39
Once Leasco established that United States jurisdiction could be based on
conduct in this country, the amount and type of conduct which would suffice
became a major issue in litigation. The following subsections examine
different aspects of this sufficient conduct issue. In each case, the court has
been concerned with "significant" rather than "substantial" conduct, look-
ing to the quality of the conduct rather than its quantity.40
a. Use of the Means or Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce
The Leasco court found that use of interstate or foreign commerce to
make fraudulent statements was a sufficient basis for United States jurisdic-
tion even where there was no significant effect in the United States. 4 1 One
subsequent antifraud decision, Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 42 suggested
that the use of the jurisdictional means is significant conduct, regardless of
what was transmitted via the mails or commerce.4 3 The Travis holding
35. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir., 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (reh. on other grounds), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), discussed supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
36. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17(a)
(1965).
38. The court dismissed suggestions in the current Restatement that some additional connec-
tion with the forum state is required. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334; see id. at 1339.
39. Id. at 1337; see AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d 148
(2d Cir. 1984), discussed infra note 53.
40. See Code § 1905(a)(l)(D)(i) (Supp. 1981), changing "substantial" conduct to "signi-
ficant" conduct, as it better expresses "the contemplated qualitative approach."
41. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1335.
42. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
43. Travis was a class action by United States shareholders of Anthes, a Canadian "target"
corporation, alleging fraud in a tender offer made by another Canadian corporation for Anthes
shares. In applying United States law, the court pointed to numerous letters and telephone calls
directed into the United States from Canada. These "incidents," said the court, "were essential
VOL. 19, NO. 2
SYMPOSIUM/SECURITIES REGULATION PERSPECTIVE 439
implied, therefore, that whenever the securities laws can be applied under
domestic constitutional law (i.e., the jurisdictional means have been used),
they could also be applied under international law (i.e., that same use
constitutes sufficient conduct). Subsequent antifraud decisions have not,
however, adopted that suggestion.44
The analogous use of the jurisdictional means as the sole basis to apply
United States law has not been accepted outside the antifraud area. For
example, as a matter of discretion, the Commission has determined not to
require registration under the Securities Act of 1933 under certain circum-
stances, even where use of the jurisdictional means to offer or sell the
security brings the transaction within the literal language of the registration
provisions.
b. Extent of Conduct Required
Both foreign and domestic investors may use the conduct doctrine to seek
the protection of United States laws, but different levels of conduct have
been required depending on the citizenship or residence of the plaintiffs.46
The simultaneous Second Circuit decisions in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
InC.47 and HT v. Vencap, Ltd.48 illustrate this. In each case, the court was
willing to offer foreigners the protections of United States law, stating in one
that "[wie do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be
used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export,
even when these are peddled only to foreigners." 49
Different standards were used, however, depending on the citizenship
and residence of the victims. In Bersch, the court did not even consider the
elements in a slowly unfolding scheme to defraud the plaintiffs involving the use of the mails and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce." Id. at 526. Thus the conduct in the United States was
"significant" not because it was itself fraudulent, but because it was "essential" to the fraudu-
lent scheme. While the Travis court noted that further misrepresentations and the closing of the
sale took place in the United States, it does not appear that these factors were important in its
analysis. Id.
44. See, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Holtz, 712 F.2d 421,424 (9th Cir. 1983) (conduct in the
United States must further the fraudulent scheme); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v.
Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979) ("The conduct in the United States
cannot be 'merely preparatory,' and must be material, that is, 'directly cause the losses.' ")
(citations omitted); F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219,
1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff was unable to prove acts
in the United States which directly caused its losses).
45. Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828 (1964) ("the Commission has
not taken any action for failure to register securities of United States corporations distributed
abroad to foreign nationals, even though use of jurisdictional means may be involved in the
offering.").
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
47. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
48. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). Bersch and Vencap were decided by the same panel.
49. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017; see Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987.
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conduct doctrine with respect to sales to United States resident citizens; the
effect on those Americans was sufficient.50 With respect to nonresident
American citizens, the court held that "preparatory" conduct in the United
States was sufficient. 51 Finally, with respect to foreigners located abroad,
the court held that there was no jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to
show more significant conduct in the United States-conduct that "directly
caused" their losses.52 In Vencap, the court refused to attribute any signifi-
cance to the small number of Americans who had invested in the plaintiff
foreign investment trust, but the court nonetheless held that United States
law would apply if the "perpetration of fraudulent acts" (in contrast to
"mere preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts") took
place here.53
Under Bersch and Vencap, United States jurisdiction depends on the
comparative significance of the domestic and foreign conduct.54 ITT v.
Cornfeld,55 a more recent decision by the same court, reiterates this bal-
ancing principle.
More expansive language used by other courts suggests that the balance
may be tipped more easily toward United States law in compelling cases,
when it appears that this country is being used as "a base for manufacturing
fraudulent security devices for export." 56 In SEC v. Kasser,57 the court
found that the conduct in this country was not "merely preparatory," and
thus upheld jurisdiction according to Bersch and Vencap, although the only
50. 519 F.2d at 989-93.
51. Id. at 992-93.
52. Id. at 993. Other courts have questioned the constitutional viability of the Second
Circuit's nationality-based distinction. See Gruenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 426 n.9
(9th Cir. 1983); Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 418 n. 14. The apparent theory is that the court's
use of alienage is a suspect classification without an accompanying compelling state interest to
justify its use, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as implied into the Fifth Amend-
ment. Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REv. 553,
569 & n.95 (1976).
53. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018; see also SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
Similarly, in its recent decision in AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership,
740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit upheld the applicability of United States
securities laws to an antifraud case, but refused to do so solely because some misrepresentations
allegedly had been made in this country. The court distinguished Leasco, noting that there "the
allegedly defrauded purchaser was a wholly-owned subsidiary of an American company whose
stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange." Id. at 153. The court went on to state that
misrepresentations are not sufficient where they "were an intermediate step in a series that
began and ended [abroad], where also the challenged contract was signed and plaintiff's
payments were made." Id.
54. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017 (rejecting jurisdiction where the preparatory activity took
place here, but the "bulk of the activity was performed in foreign countries"); Bersch, 519 F.2d
at 987 (rejecting jurisdiction where "United States activities . .. are relatively small in
comparison to those abroad").
55. 619 F.2d 909, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. See Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017, supra text accompanying note 49.
57. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
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victim of the alleged fraud was Canadian. The court hinted at a more
expansive standard, stating that "the federal securities laws . . .grant
jurisdiction.., where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent
scheme occurs in this country."' 58 In Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 59 the court upheld United States jurisdiction even
though only part of a long series of negotiations took place in this country. 60
As in Bersch, courts in other cases have found that the foreign elements of
a transaction preclude application of United States law. For example, when
Swiss and Bahamian corporations and a West German citizen sued Swiss
and French corporations and individuals, alleging fraud in the sale of one of
the defendant corporations' promissory notes, the Second Circuit held the
transaction "predominantly foreign" and affirmed the district court's dis-
missal for lack of jurisdiction. 61 The court noted that the conduct alleged to
have occurred in the United States was apparently that of the plaintiffs, not
defendants.62 In an attempt to cure this problem, the same plaintiffs brought
another action against the American parent corporation of the previous
defendants. 63 The district court still refused to apply United States law,
noting that [u]nder neither of these theories [conduct or effects] does the
outcome turn on the nature of the defendant." 64
Conduct in the United States can alone be a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion. There need be no effect in this country; much of the conduct can be
58. Id. at 114. "By sustaining the decision of the district court as to lack of jurisdiction, we
would, in effect, create a haven for . . . defrauders and manipulators. We are reluctant to
conclude that Congress intended to allow the United States to become a 'Barbary Coast,' as it
were, harboring international securities 'pirates.' " Id. at 116.
59. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1978).
60. The case involved alleged nondisclosure of a licensing dispute in the sale of Pacific Seeds,
an Australian corporation, to the plaintiff Continental Grain, an Australian subsidiary of a
United States corporation. The defendants, one Australian and one United States corporation
and one United States individual, were the owners of Pacific Seeds. The court found that the
only activity in the United States consisted of mail and telephone calls, but nonetheless held
that this country was the "origin" of the nondisclosure. Id. at 411-12. The court noted that the
decision "is largely based upon policy considerations." Id. at 416. Accord Kasser, 548 F.2d at
116 ("From a policy perspective ... there are sound rationales for asserting jurisdiction."). See
also United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978)
(dismissing as "simply unimaginable" that "Congress would allow America to be a haven for
swindlers and confidence men when the victims are European while expecting the highest level
of business practice when the investors are American").
61. Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull
S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1979). The facts suggest that the transaction was not merely
"predominantly" but exclusively foreign. See infra note 62.
62. Id. The connection with the United States in the Fidenas cases (see infra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text for discussion of a subsequent case on these same facts) is quite remote. It
appears that the plaintiffs were simply unable to find any conduct in the United States, except
knowledge on the part of the United States corporate parent of the foreign corporate defen-
dants' actions.
63. Fidenas AG v. Honeywell, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. Id. at 1041.
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foreign-based. Nonetheless, although the policy justifications for applying
United States law are compelling, they are not limitless.
c. Nature of the Conduct Required
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions answer a critical question left open
by Bersch and Vencap: will United States antifraud law be applied on the
basis of conduct in the United States other than the making of the false or
misleading statements? In liT v. Cornfeld,65 the court upheld jurisdiction
under the conduct test based on the combined presence of two factors-
securities transactions had occurred in this country (in the over-the-counter
market and a face-to-face transaction), and the issuers of the securities were
American. Similarly, in Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 6 6 a commodities
antifraud decision, the Second Circuit stated that "[tirading activities on
United States commodities markets were significant acts without which
[plaintiff's] losses could not have occurred, and are sufficient to establish
jurisdiction." 67
The specific types of conduct occurring in the United States are important
to the SEC in determining whether foreign entities are subject to the
registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act. "Foreign private
issuers ' 68 can be exempt from the registration and periodic reporting re-
quirements of Sections 12(g) and 13(a) of the Exchange Act 6 9 unless their
securities are quoted on an automated system in the United States.70
Such systems, the Commission explained, are analagous to securities
65. 619 F.2d 909,917-19 (2d Cir. 1980); see also AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment
Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 53.
66. 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 1048; see also Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107-08
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984). Extraterritorial analysis under the commod-
ities antifraud provisions is drawn from securities law analysis. See Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1044.
The Psimenos court found the domestic creation and trading of the commodity futures
contracts constitute "at least as strong a factor in favor of finding jurisdiction as do securities of a
United States corporation traded in the United States." Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1047, discussing
lIT v. Cornfeld.
68. The term "foreign private issuer" is defined identically in Securities Act Rule 405, 17
C.F.R. 230.405, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R. 240.3b-4, to include any
foreign national or corporation unless: (1) the majority of its voting securities are owned by
United States residents; and (2) a majority of the officers and directors are United States
citizens or residents, or a majority of the assets are located here, or the business is "adminis-
tered principally in the United States."
69. Sections 12(g) and 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 781(g) and 78m(a),
and Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-1, require registration of a class of
securities and periodic reporting by the issuer if the securities are held by more than 500
persons, and the issuer has over $3 million in assets.
70. Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-1, provides that securities of
foreign private issuers with total assets less than $3 million, which would otherwise be exempt
from the registration and periodic reporting requirements, are not exempt if quoted on such a
system. Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2(b), exempts securities of foreign private issuers
of any size from the registration and periodic reporting requirements under certain conditions,
unless quoted on such a system. Rule 12g3-2(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. 12g3-2(d)(3).
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exchanges, 71 and "[issuers of] foreign securities included in NASDAQ
should be regarded as voluntarily seeking U.S. trading markets, and hence
should be denied the information-supplying exemption." ' 72 With respect
to foreign underwritings which may involve domestic issuers or broker-
dealers, the only activities in the United States that an unregistered broker-
dealer can perform are those which are incidental to a distribution for
foreigners outside of the United States.73 In both these areas, a balancing of
domestic and foreign conduct similar to that in Bersch, Vencap and Cornfeld
is evident.
3. The "Nationality" Doctrine
The third ground for applying United States law is nationality. The effects
and conduct doctrines are based on international law principles of territo-
riality-that a nation has jurisdiction over conduct affecting or occurring in
its possessions. 74 The nationality doctrine, in contrast, postulates that a
nation has an interest in applying its law with respect to its citizens wherever
they are located.75
The nationality doctrine has not been extensively applied by our courts.76
In Bersch, for example, although the court recognized "the power of the
United States to impose rules on the conduct of its nationals," 77 it refused to
apply the antifraud provisions solely on that basis, stating:
Congress surely did not mean the securities laws to protect the many thousands of
Americans residing in foreign countries against securities frauds by foreigners
acting there, and we see no sufficient reason to believe it would have intended
otherwise simply because an American participated so long as he had done
nothing in the United States.78
B. ANALYSIS UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
Section 1905 of the Code incorporates much of the existing law on
extraterritorial application of the United States securities law. 79 The section
71. Securities traded on an exchange must be registered pursuant to § 12(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 781(b).
72. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20264, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,736, 46,737 (1983).
73. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7366, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 10
introductory note a (1965) (current Restatement); see also supra note 5.
75. See generally Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
921-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing territoriality and nationality principles). The Draft Re-
statement recognizes nationality as a basis for applying United States law, particularly with
respect to "private law," e.g., wills and succession, family, and divorce law. Draft Restatement
§ 402 comment c.
76. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016; Code § 1905,
comment 11(f).
77. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 30 (1965) (current Restatement).
78. Id. at 992.
79. Code, introduction at vi.
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provides for broad and flexible administration, by extensively applying
United States law, but also authorizing the Commission to make rules
narrowing or broadening the scope of those provisions. 80
The drafters of the Code state that they intended neither to exceed nor
exhaust the limits of international law with these provisions. 8' Nonetheless,
there is a tension between the two provisions for applying the Code, Sec-
tions 1905 and 1902. Section 1905(a) would direct extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Code "within the limits of international law," but Section 1902(f)
would direct application of the Code "to the full extent of the constitutional
authority of the Congress." The former provision is directed primarily at
transnational transactions, and the latter primarily at domestic transactions,
but neither explicitly so states. Literally, Section 1902(f) would mandate
sweeping international application of United States securities laws.82 And it
is not clear whether Sections 1905(a), limiting the Code to the bounds of
international law, would counter the broader constitutional authority in
Section 1902.83
1. "Catchall" Provisions
The Code contains "catchall" provisions which are patterned after the
effects and conduct doctrines as developed under current judicial analysis.
Section 1905(a)(1)(D)(ii) would apply United States law if some or all
elements of otherwise actionable conduct occur outside this country but
cause a "substantial effect" in this country "as a direct and reasonably
foreseeable result." And Section 1905(a)(1)(D)(i) would apply United
States law to actionable conduct that occurs "to a significant (but not
necessarily predominant) extent within the United States." 84
2. Conduct Occurring Within the United States
The drafters of the Code believed that the effects and conduct doctrines
are "too general and [do] not ... afford sufficient guidance to the courts." 85
In addition, they stated that authority in this area should not be the "central
responsibility" of the Commission. 86 Therefore, the drafters wrote specific
80. Code § 1905(c); see Loss, Extraterritoriality in the Federal Securities Code, 29 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 305, 308 (1979) (Code represents "blending" of judicial expertise in international law with
the Commission's expertise in rulemaking).
81. Code § 1905 comment 1(c).
82. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (similar potential under current provisions of
the Securities Act).
83. The Code drafters note that the same problem exists under current Securities Exchange
Act § 30, 15 U.S.C. 78dd. Code § 1905 comment 1(a). See also Draft Restatement § 403(4)(b)
(if Congress' purpose is clear, United States law would apply if within constitutional limits).
84. See supra note 40 (Section 1905(a)(1)(D)(i) read "substantial" rather than "significant"
conduct prior to 1981).
85. Code § 1905 comment 1(b)(ii).
86. The Code drafters gave the Commission ancillary rulemaking authority, see supra note
80 and accompanying text, but determined that the major provisions should be statutory. See
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statutory rules, applying United States law to any purchase, sale or offer to
buy or sell any security, proxy solicitation, tender offer or other circulariza-
tion of security holders, or activity as an investment adviser which "occur[s]
within the United States although... initiated outside the United States."
87
The Code language conforms to current judicial analysis, 88 but provides the
certainty of unambiguous statutory language.
3. Conduct Occurring Outside the United States
Additional provisions direct extraterritorial application of certain securi-
ties laws regardless of conduct in the United States. Section 1905(a)(2)
would apply the Code's antifraud provisions to offers, purchases and sales,
proxies, tender offers, and activity as an investment adviser if initiated in
this country but "occur[ing]" elsewhere. 89 This is analogous to the "export
of fraud" theory articulated by the courts. 90 And Section 1905(a)(1)(B)
would apply United States law, without regard to the existence of any
conduct in this country, to nonresidents who had obtained an identifiable
status to which the Code attaches legal consequences. This status includes:
(i) registrants under any provisions of the securities laws; 91 (ii) officers,
directors and shareholders regulated under Sections 13, 14(d) and 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act; 92 and (iii) banks and participants in registered
clearing agencies.
93
Code § 1905, comment 1(c) (noting reliance on Commission rules "to tailor that expression of
power to the appropriate policy considerations ... could result in litigation (as many [rules]
already have) under the Code").
87. Code § 1905(a)(1)(A). Domestically, the Code would apply generally to registrants,
affiliates, and associates, and to anyone who used the mails or interstate or foreign commerce.
Code § 1902(b)-(c). These standards may present interpretative problems when construed
together with the provisions of § 1905. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
88. See Code § 1905 comment 3 (citing cases involving offers, sales, proxies, tender offers).
89. Code § 1905(a)(2) provides for the application only of Part XVI of the Code, which deals
with fraud, misrepresentation and manipulation, and the portion of Part XVII creating civil
liabilities for violation of Part XVI. Section 1905(b)(1) covers the remaining portions of the
Code, directing that the Code not apply in any respect to any other act occurring outside the
United States.
90. See supra text accompanying note 49.
91. Proxy solicitations under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a), are
covered under the Code provision relating to registrants. See Code §§ 1902(b)(1), 603(a).
92. Sections 13(d) and (g) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d), (g), impose
reporting obligations on owners of more than five percent of any class of equity securities of a
registered corporation. Section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. 78n(d), imposes reporting and other obliga-
tions on tender offerors. Section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. 78p(a), imposes reporting obligations on
officers, directors, and ten-percent shareholders. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) is the
"short-swing" profits provision; see supra note 28. Code § 1905 comment a states that this
provision would apply § 16(b) "short-swing" liability to a foreign officer, director or share-
holder of a foreign corporation, in transactions abroad. Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), reached the opposite conclusion on these facts. See discussion of § 16(b)
applicationsupra notes 27-32. The Code drafters, noting Wagman, nonetheless state that there
is "no longer any substantial doubt about the constitutionality of this kind of provision." Code §
1905(e)(3) comment 2.
93. Code § 1905(a)(l)(B), incorporating § 1902(b), which in turn incorporates §§ 605-606.
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4. Other Special Provisions
The Code drafters believed that the securities laws other than the anti-
fraud provisions should have narrower extraterritorial application. 94 Sec-
tion 1905(b)(1) recognizes this policy generally, and Sections 1905(b)(2) and
(3) would apply it specifically to nonresident brokers, dealers and invest-
ment advisers.
No registration would be required under the Code if a nonresident broker
or dealer did business with a person outside the United States, or with a
nonresident foreigner already a customer and temporarily in the United
States,95 or if a nonresident broker-dealer had a limited participation in an
underwriting initiated in the United States, and all the shares were sold
outside the United States.96 This would be true regardless of any trading on
United States markets that would otherwise satisfy the effects or conduct
test.
9 7
C. ANALYSIS UNDER THE DRAFT RESTATEMENT
The Draft Restatement uses the traditional bases of jurisdiction, as in
current and Code analysis, 98 but only as a starting point. To make a final
jurisdictional determination under the Draft Restatement, it is necessary to
"analyze various interests, examine contacts and links, give effect to jus-
tified expectations, search for the 'center of gravity' of a given situation, and
develop priorities." 99 This is labelled the "principle of reasonableness";
jurisdiction may be exercised under the Draft Restatement only if it would
not be unreasonable.to
94. Fraudulent offers from the United States should be subjected to our laws "so as to avoid
[this] territory's being used as a base to injure persons in other states." But the registration and
prospectus requirements of the Securities Act do not have such a broad mission, according to
the Code drafters. "As a matter of prosecutor's discretion," these provisions do not extend "as
far as [they] might under international law." Code § 1905 comment 4.
95. Code § 1905(b)(2). Similar exemptions for essentially foreign transactions now exist in
other circumstances. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (Securities Act registration);
infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (Securities Exchange Act registration).
96. Code § 1905(b)(3). This standard is taken directly from Securities Act Release No. 4708,
29 Fed. Reg. at 9828, but without that release's limitation that sales outside the United States be
only to foreign citizens. See, e.g., Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws to Interna-
tional Securities Transactions, 45 ALBANY L. REV. 890, 926-27 (1981).
97. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (under current law, execution of trade on a
domestic exchange is significant); Draft Restatement § 416(2)(a) (trading on United States
markets is a significant factor).
98. Compare Draft Restatement § 402(1)-(2) (conduct, effects and nationality as bases for
jurisdiction) with Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 17, 18, 30 (1965) (current Restatement) (same).
99. Draft Restatement, Pt. IV, c. 1, introductory note.
100. See Draft Restatement § 403 comment a.
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1. The "Effects" Doctrine
Section 402(1)(c) recognizes that a state may exercise jurisdiction with
respect to "conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory." The language regarding "intended
effect" is broader than current law; current analysis has not suggested that
only an intent to affect United States citizens or markets would, without any
actual effect, be a sufficient basis under the effects doctrine to apply United
States law. 101
The reasonableness analysis under Draft Restatement Section 403 tem-
pers the sweeping language about the effects doctrine that appears in
Section 402. Section 403(2)(a)(ii) lists as one of the reasonableness factors
"the extent to which the activity ... has substantial, direct and foreseeable
effect upon or in the regulating state." This is a more traditional statement
of the effects doctrine.'0 2 As under current analysis,103 Draft Section
403(2)(b) would look to effect upon United States citizens. Also like current
law, 10 4 Draft Section 403(2)(g) would compare foreign effects with domestic
effects. Thus, in a few respects, the Draft Restatement fairly restates the
effects doctrine, but differs because it would no longer be dispositive.
Rather, sufficient effects would become only one factor among many others
to be considered.
2. The "Conduct" Doctrine
Section 402(1)(a) recognizes that a state may exercise jurisdiction with
respect to "conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its terri-
tory." This standard is different from that set by the current Restatement,
which recognizes a state's jurisdiction to "attach ... legal consequences to
conduct that occurs within its territory."' 0 5
101. See supra text accompanying note 3 (extent of current analysis under effects doctrine).
102. The "substantial, direct and foreseeable" language comes directly from the current
Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18(b) (1965); see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.), 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (reh. on other grounds), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
103. See, e.g., supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), discussed supra notes
30-32 and accompanying text, finding no personal jurisdiction based on effect in the United
States where the plaintiff, defendant, corporation, and transaction were all Canadian; Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), discussed
supra notes 16-17 and 33 and accompanying text, finding no subject-matter jurisdiction based
on effect in the United States as to foreign plaintiffs.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17(a)
(1965). The Draft's requirement that "a substantial part" of the conduct take place here may
qualify the present standard. On the other hand, that language probably recognizes that
conduct does not necessarily "occur" in only one place. This is in accord with modern case law,
which does not locate the acts in one place, but compares the domestic and foreign conduct.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-64. The language also differs from that of Code




As with the effects doctrine, certain portions of the current judicial
application of the conduct doctrine are reflected in the reasonableness
factors listed in Section 403. Section 403(2)(a)(i) lists as a reasonableness
factor "the extent to which the activity takes place within the regulating
state." This statement recognizes that in some cases, while there may be
sufficient conduct for the state to apply its own law, conduct elsewhere
makes it more reasonable for another state's law to apply. In addition,
Section 403(2)(b) looks to a link such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity with those protected or prosecuted under the law to be applied. This
also reflects one aspect of current law; under Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 106 preparatory conduct in the United States is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident American citizens, but not those
of foreigners located abroad.
3. The "Nationality" Doctrine
Section 402(2) generally recognizes that a state may exercise jurisdiction
with respect to "the conduct, status, interests or relations of its nationals
outside its territory." Section 418, a special application of the nationality
doctrine, t0 7 governs United States jurisdiction over foreign branches of
United States corporations and foreign corporations controlled by United
States corporations or individuals. The United States may exercise jurisdic-
tion over a foreign branch of a domestic corporation under Section 418,
subject to the "reasonableness" analysis of Section 403. By contrast, the
United States may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary of a domes-
tic corporation under Section 418 only if it is part of a program of economic
regulation applicable to United States nationals and in furtherance of a
national interest requiring application of United States law.10 8
A significant limitation on the exercise of United States jurisdiction is
Section 418(4)(a), directing that United States jurisdiction may not be
exercised over foreign branches or subsidiaries when compliance with
United States law would bring the foreign branches or subsidiaries into
conflict with the state "where the branch or corporation is organized or
doing business....1 9 The section also prohibits United States regulation of
"predominantly local" conduct, such as employment practices of branches
or subsidiaries outside United States territory. 10
106. 519 F.2d 974,992-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), discussedsupra notes
50-52 and accompanying text.
107. Section 418 applies only where United States jurisdiction is based on nationality, not on
conduct or effects. Draft Restatement § 418 and comment a.
108. Id. § 418(2)-(3).
109. Id. § 418(4)(a).
110. Id. § 418(4)(b). Although § 418 comment f contains a list of examples of such conduct,
which are labeled "non-controversial," the entries in that list are far from non-controversial.
See infra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
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It is not clear whether Section 418's nationality-based jurisdictional
framework applies at all to United States securities laws, which are covered,
at least in part, in Section 416. 1t The commentary to Section 418 requires
"clear" Congressional intent to apply United States law based on national-
ity, but does not specify what intent would suffice. '1 2 The antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws are usually applied based on conduct or effects
in the United States,1" 3 and would not be subject to significant limitation
under Section 418.
4. New Factors in the Draft Restatement
From the effects, conduct, and nationality beginning described above, the
Draft Restatement departs radically from current law. Section 403(1) of the
Draft provides that jurisdiction may be exercised only if it is "reasonable"
in light of the factors listed in Section 403(2). Although the factors in Section
403(2)(a) and (b) restate some aspects of the effects and conduct
doctrines," 4 the remaining factors differ significantly from the current
Restatement and current judicial analysis. 115 The factors listed in Section
403(2) are not all-inclusive, and the weight to be given each is not
specified. 116
The additional reasonableness factors in Section 403(2)(c)-(h) I 7 would
111. The comments note that § 418 applies "in contexts not covered by other sections" such
as § 416, relating to securities transactions. Draft Restatement § 418 comment a. But it is
doubtful that § 416 does or was intended to apply to every area of securities law. See infra notes
127-129 and accompanying text (discussing scope of § 416).
112. While "general legislation" or "general phrases" are not sufficient, see Draft Restate-
ment § 418 comment g, neither the comment, nor § 403(4)(b) on which it is based, is clear as to
what expression of Congressional intent will suffice. The reporters appear to be satisfied that
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is an example of "explicit" Congressional intent to apply
United States law extraterritorially on the basis of nationality, regardless of any foreign conflict.
Id. § 418 reporters' note 4.
113. Although nationality is a recognized basis for jurisdiction, it is rarely used. See supra
notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
115. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 17, 18, 30 (1965) (conduct, effects and nationality as sufficient bases for jurisdiction)
with Draft Restatement § 402 comment a ("while links of territoriality or nationality are
generally necessary, they are not sufficient in all cases").
116. "The list of considerations... is not exhaustive .... While the first considerations listed
[§§ 403(2)(a)-(b)] relates to the principal bases of jurisdiction-territoriality or nationality-no
special significance or scheme of priorities is implied in the order in which the factors are listed."
Draft Restatement § 403 comment b. But see AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment
Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding "factors (a)(i) and possibly (b)
pointing in favor of application of [antifraud provisions of United States securities law], factors
(g) and (h) against such application, and most of the other factors inapplicable, dubious and
neutral," implying that factors (a) and (b) are of greater weight since the court upheld
jurisdiction).
117. Those factors are:
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
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require consideration of new issues even when the court's ultimate decision
is that United States law cannot be applied. In the Fidenas cases, for exam-
ple, United States courts refused to apply our laws to either foreign or
Unites States defendants, because the "essential core of the alleged fraud"
was outside the United States. s18 Under Section 403(2), however, the
analysis would not be complete at this point. A court applying the Draft
Restatement would be required to consider the new factors: that the activity
to be regulated, fraud in a securities transaction, is important in the United
States" 9 and our regulation of such activity is generally accepted, but that
on balance, few if any of the parties had a justified expectation that United
States law would apply; that although our regulation of securities transac-
tions and fraud in those transactions may be of some importance in the
international system, and may in fact be reasonably consistent with the
traditions of that system, the interests of other states may be greater than
the interests of the United States. Thus, even assuming that the court would
reach the conclusion that the facts do not reasonably call for the application
of United States law, the Draft Restatement would require a more detailed
analysis and a greater expenditure of judicial resources than under current
law or under the Code.
Section 403(3) imposes a further restriction upon jurisdiction not imposed
by the current Restatement. In the event of an actual conflict among states
whose jurisdiction is not unreasonable, an absolute choice should be made
among the laws of the various states. Consequently, all but one state are
denied jurisdiction. 120
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
See infra pp. 456-57 (application of these factors to Bersch facts).
118. Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale pour L'Inforatique CII Honeywell Bull
S.A.,606 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1979). In the later case against the United States defendants, the
court held that the analysis remains unchanged. Fidenas AG v. Honeywell, Inc., 501 F. Supp.
1029, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), discussed supra notes 63-64 & infra notes 161-169 and accom-
panying text.
119. See supra notes 58, 60 (statements of courts emphasizing United States interest in
preventing fraud perpetrated on the foreigners).
120. Section 403(3) requires a court to reevaluate its choice of law if, although reasonable, it
would require "a person to take action that would violate a regulation of another state which is
not unreasonable under those criteria." In essence, the provision directs a court to resolve the
problem of inconsistent conduct requirements by trying its balancing process again.
A court, following the Draft Restatement analysis in a securities case, would have come full
circle at this point. Having decided that there was sufficient conduct, effects, or nationality, and
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Another jurisdictional provision, Section 419, sets forth specific applica-
tions of the rules of Section 403(3), "when two states having jurisdiction to
prescribe with respect to a person issue contradictory commands.' ' 121 It
would change current law, reflected in the current Restatement, by using the
reasonableness analysis under Section 403(2) to decide whether to apply
United States law when it would directly conflict with another state's
requirements. 122
If the act in question was to be performed outside United States territory,
Section 419(1) would "ordinarily" defer to the contrary government com-
pulsion of the state where the act was to be done or where the actor was a
national. If, on the other hand, the act was to be performed in the United
States, Section 419(2) would "generally" allow the United States to exercise
its jurisdiction, even if the result would force a foreign national to violate his
country's law. The provision represents a departure from current law, which
generally has been less solicitous of foreign government compulsion which
contradicts United States law, regardless of where the act is to be per-
formed. 123 Under the current Restatement, in contrast, courts are given
greater discretion to allow inconsistent standards of conduct to apply to a
person. 24
5. Specific Securities Provisions
Section 416 "illustrate[s]" the application of the Draft Restatement's
jurisdictional principles to transnational securities transactions.125 Section
416 approaches jurisdiction to apply United States securities laws in terms of
that application of United States law would not be "unreasonable," the court would therefore
apply United States law. But if that law directed one of the parties to do something that would
be illegal under the law of another nation, which would have a "reasonable" interest in having
its law applied, then the United States court would have to begin another reasonableness
analysis.
121. Draft Restatement § 419 comment a.
122. Draft Restatement § 419 comment a. Compare id. § 403(2) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965) (current Restatement),
which requires a court to consider more traditional factors: vital national interest, conduct,
effects, nationality and practicability.
123. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (llth Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3086 (1983); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965) (each state is to consider, "in good faith," moderating its enforcement jurisdiction), and
id. §§ 37, 39 (inconsistent requirements do not necessarily defeat a court's jurisdiction); see also
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27, 952 n.169 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (noting that courts should permit concurrent exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe,
yielding if at all only after reduction to judgment, and criticizing Draft Restatement on this
ground).
The Draft states that the existence of concurrent inconsistent judgments by different courts
regarding the same person is generally "an intolerable situation." Draft Restatement § 403
comment d. Resolution of such conflicts would be required before jurisdiction could be
asserted. Id. § 403 reporters' note 10.
125. Draft Restatement § 403 comment g.
SPRING 1985
452 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
"transactions in securities" and divides those transactions into two catego-
ries: those which are carried out on a securities market in the United States
and those which are not. 126
Under Section 416(1), United States securities law would be applied to
"[a]ny transaction in securities carried out, or intended to be carried out, on
a securities market in the United States"; it is not necessary to apply the
reasonableness analysis of Section 403, because application of United States
law under these circumstances is per se reasonable.1 27 The drafters of this
provision note that this situation "provides the clearest case for regulatory
jurisdiction," and that none of the Section 403 factors "exerts a strong pull
against application of United States law."' ' 2
8
Section 416(2) sets forth three additional "links" between securities trans-
actions and the United States: where securities of the same issuer are traded
on markets here; where some representations are made or negotiations
occur here; and where parties to be protected or subject to regulation are
United States residents. But these Section 416(2) links do not have the same
effect as does trading on a United States market under Section 416(1). If
these links are present, the transaction must nonetheless satisfy Section
403's reasonableness analysis. And if these links are absent, this "gives
strong indication of lack of jurisdiction to apply United States law."' 29 Thus,
the provisions of Section 416(2) do not serve any independent functional
purpose in the analysis under the Draft Restatement, because the court
must in any event refer back to Section 403, and decide the case based on
reasonableness analysis.
D. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
This subsection presents five examples which illustrate the contrast be-
tween the present law with respect to the extraterritorial application of the
federal securities laws and the Code, on the one hand, and jurisdiction
under the Draft Restatement, on the other hand. The first three examples
are drawn from reported cases involving the antifraud and short-swing
trading provisions of the United States securities laws. In the first case,
126. Except as noted infra under § 416(1), the reasonableness analysis is still required under
§ 416. "The overall test of jurisdiction under §§ 402 and 403, however, is reasonableness, and
the links set out in this section are illustrative, not exhaustive or conclusive in all cases." Draft
Restatement § 416 comment c.
127. Id. § 416 reporters' note 2. The drafters do not specify the activity under § 416(1) that
constitutes trading "on a securities market" or "intent" to do so.
128. Id. In the antitrust area, the District of Columbia Circuit has noted that similar
"short-circuit" provisions in Draft Restatement § 415(2) could also make any reasonableness
analysis unnecessary. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950 n. 152 (under § 415(2), "the reason-
ableness [test] of § 403(2) will often be superfluous"),
129. Id. § 416 comment c.
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United States jurisdiction was upheld in part and denied in part in an
antifraud action involving different classes of plaintiffs. In the second case,
two different courts reached opposite conclusions in cases involving the
short-swing trading provisions as applied to foreign corporations. In the
third case, the court found no connection with the United States antifraud
law to either foreign or domestic defendants. The other two examples
examine the activities of investment advisers and periodic reporting by
foreign issuers of securities.
1. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 130
Bersch was a class action brought on behalf of purchasers of I.O.S.,
Ltd. ("lOS") common stock. Plaintiffs alleged that there were material
omissions and false and misleading financial statements in prospectuses used
in three contemporaneous offerings of OS stock. 131
The first of the three distributions was a primary offering of 5.6 million
shares, sold exclusively outside of the United States to foreign nationals
residing in Europe, Asia and Australia with a prospectus emanating from
London or Brussels. This offering was underwritten by two United States
and four European investment banking concerns. The second distribution
was a secondary offering of 1.45 million shares, made from Canada solely to
Canadian resident nationals, and underwritten by a Toronto investment
banker. The third distribution was another secondary offering of 3.95 mil-
lion shares, made without an underwriter by a wholly-owned subsidiary of
lOS, which was organized under the laws of Nassau, Grand Bahamas.132
The prospectus for that offering stated that the offering was being made to
approximately 25,000 persons who were either employees, existing clients
of lOS, or persons with an established professional or business relationship
with the company. Despite statements in the prospectus that the shares were
not being offered in the United States or any other territory subject to its
jurisdiction, at least 22 Americans living in this country purchased 41,936
shares in the third offering.'1 33
a. Current Law
As discussed earlier, the Bersch court made three different findings
depending on the class of plaintiffs. The court held that United States law
applied to the claims of resident United States citizens, because there is "a
direct effect" in this country. 134 With respect to nonresident United States
130. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), discussed supra notes 16-17
& 47-52 and accompanying text.
131. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 981.
132. Id. at 979-80.
133. Id. at 991.
134. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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citizens, the court held that some conduct by the defendants in the United
States was necessary; "acts (or culpable failures to act) of material impor-
tance in the United States [must] have significantly contributed" to the
plaintiffs' loss. Although the conduct occurring in the United States must be
"of material importance," it need not be the predominant conduct at issue;
the court noted that "merely preparatory" conduct, "small in comparison to
[the activities] abroad," would suffice. 135 As to foreigners, the court held
that they must show conduct in the United States by the defendants which
directly caused their losses, and that on the facts there was no such conduct.
b. The Code
Analysis under Section 1905 of the Code would substantially parallel that
undertaken by the Bersch court. Sales to resident citizens would occur
"within the United States although ... initiated outside the United States"
under Section 1905(a)(1)(A), and the Code would apply to those sales. Sales
to nonresident citizens would be covered under either of two Code provi-
sions. Section 1905 (a)(1)(D)(i) applies the Code to "prohibited, required,
or actionable conduct whose constituent elements occur to a significant (but
not necessarily predominant) extent within the United States." This follows
the Bersch court's holding that activities in this country relating to nonresi-
dent citizens, although "preparatory," will support application of United
States law if they are "of material importance" and "have significantly
contributed" to the plaintiff's losses. 136 Alternatively, Section 1905(a)(2)
applies the Code's antifraud provisions (at issue here) to sales which occur
outside, but are initiated in, the United States. The "preparatory" conduct
of the Bersch defendants would satisfy this standard.
With respect to offers and sales to foreign nationals abroad, the Code
would diverge from the Bersch decision. United States law would apply
under the same provisions-Sections 1905(a)(1)(D)(i) and 1905(a)(2)-
applicable to Americans resident abroad. Unlike Bersch, the Code makes
no distinction based on the plaintiff's nationality.' 37
135. Id. This is a mixture of the "effects" doctrine, which was used to sustain jurisdiction as
to resident citizens, and the "conduct" doctrine, which was relied on exclusively in relation to
the foreign plaintiffs. The Bersch court apparently viewed nonresident citizens as somewhere in
between.
136. 519 F.2d at 993. In discussing § 1905(a)(1)(D)(i), the Code drafters point primarily to
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed
supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. Code § 1905(a)(1)(D)(i) comment 1 (b)(ii). Bersch is
cited for the contrary conclusion, that "merely preparatory" acts do not suffice, id., but that
holding in Bersch related only to foreign plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying note 135.
137. Section 1905 does, however, distinguish between residents and nonresidents. See
§§ 1905(a)(1)(B), 1905(b)(2), and 1903(b)(3); see also supra note 52 (nationality-based distinc-
tion of questionable constitutionality).
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c. The Draft Restatement
The Draft Restatement would raise doubts as to whether United States
law would apply to sales to citizens abroad. It is not even clear whether there
would be jurisdiction where the Second Circuit in Bersch found it most
compelling-the sales of securities to resident citizens-because of the
"reasonableness" evaluation required under Section 403(2).
The first step in the analysis would be to determine whether there is a basis
for jurisdiction under Section 402. The Bersch court relied on the effects
doctrine with respect to resident United States citizens, and the same
analysis could be made under the effects doctrine as stated in Section
402(1)(c). The court relied on both the effects and the conduct doctrines
with respect to nonresident citizens. Section 402(1)(a), however, requires
that "a substantial part" of the conduct take place in this country. It is
unlikely that this standard was satisfied with respect to sales to either
nonresident Americans or foreigners. Although there were "acts . . . of
material importance in the United States [which] ... significantly contrib-
uted" to the offering, 138 Section 402(1)(a) appears to require a more quan-
titative evaluation of the extent to which the actionable conduct took place
in this country, which might yield no jurisdiction based on conduct.
Turning to Section 416, it is unlikely that any of the sales would call for
application of United States law under Section 416(1), as transactions
carried out on a market in the United States, because there probably was no
such "market" within the meaning of Section 416(1).139 Thus, it would be
necessary to determine if one of the Section 416(2) jurisdictional links is
present; if not, application of United States law would be unlikely.""'
Section 416(2)(c) would apply to the sales of securities to Americans here,
since "the persons sought to be protected are residents of the United
States." The nonresident American plaintiffs, however, would not be a
relevant jurisdictional link; Section 416(2)(c) mentions only United States
residents as a link on the plaintiff's side. Links on the defendants' side under
Section 416(2)(c) would allow application of that subsection to all of the
sales, since three of the ten defendants, the "part[ies] subject to the regula-
tion," were "United States national[s] or resident[s]." In any event, the
138. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
139. As noted above, only a small part of the offering was sold to a relatively small number of
United States citizens. Had there been a greater distribution of securities in the United States,
conceivably § 416(1) would apply because of the creation of a United States market in lOS
securities. This assumes, however, that the term "market" includes informal markets as well as
registered exchanges and electronic quotation systems. See infra note 232.
If the application of the antifraud provisions of § 17(a) of the Securities Act to the offer of
securities (as well as the sale) were at issue, classification under § 416 of the Draft Restatement
would be problematic. It is not clear whether an offer absent a sale would be considered a
"transaction" in securities.
140. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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presence of a Section 416(2)(c) link is not "conclusive"; United States
jurisdiction "might be reasonable if the person had other close and con-
tinuing links with the United States. ''141
Any assertion of jurisdiction under Section 402 or Section 416(2) is
subject to a further reasonableness evaluation under Section 403(2), and
many of the pertinent factors in that subsection could cut against applying
United States law. Turning first to Section 403(2)(a)(i), securities were sold
to resident Americans only in one of the three offerings. The prospectus for
that offering emanated from Geneva or the Bahamas and was presumably
mailed into the United States, and there was no other activity here with
respect to the offering. 42 Thus, unless activity of United States underwriters
in the primary offering is taken into account, 43 nothing took place, to any
great extent, in this country. Under Section 403(2)(a)(ii), it may be difficult
to establish the extent to which the offer and sale had a "substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the [United States]." The sales to nonresi-
dents had no apparent effect within the United States.
Analysis under Section 403(2)(b) is also unlikely to provide support for
application of United States law. There were links between the United
States and some of the defendants, as well as some of the plaintiffs, but such
links were hardly predominant. 44
Under Section 403(2)(c), the court could be required to undertake an
exhaustive policy analysis of United States antifraud laws in an international
context, considering the "character of the activity to be regulated," how
important that regulation is to the United States, whether there are similar
antifraud laws in other nations, and the extent to which such antifraud laws
are "generally accepted." This provision seems to require a survey of
national laws and judgments as to the value of such antifraud laws. Such a
survey would not have a predictable result. Furthermore, the survey itself
may be offensive to foreign governments. 45
Section 403(2)(d) refers to the "existence of justified expectations that
might be protected or hurt" by application of United States law. Here, the
defendants probably intended that United States law not apply to any of the
offerings, but they had no reason to believe that the antifraud provisions
would not apply. 46 Moreover, the United States resident citizen purchasers
141. Draft Restatement § 416 reporters' note 3.
142. The seller of the securities was a Bahamian subsidiary of the issuer, which in turn was a
Canadian corporation headquartered in Switzerland. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 979-80.
143. See supra text preceding note 132.
144. Approximately 11.1 million shares were sold in the three offerings; the court could
identify at most 42,000 shares that were sold to United States residents. Bersch, 519 F.2d at
979-80, 991.
145. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
146. The transactions were structured to avoid application of the registration requirements.
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 979-80. However, as the court stated, "[i]t is elementary that the anti-fraud
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probably expected at least the antifraud provisions of United States law to
apply.
The next criteria, Sections 403(2)(e) and (f), require a determination of
the "importance" of the regulation to and its "consisten[cy] with the tradi-
tions of the international system," but the meaning of "international sys-
tem" is not explained. Presumably, application of the antifraud provisions
to international offerings of securities is important to, and consistent with,
the international economic system, but such a determination is not clear.
Section 403(2)(g) refers to the interests of other states "in regulating the
activity." Several states were involved in the IOS liquidation process, and
states other than this country must have been interested in the IOS offering,
since the overwhelming majority of the purchasers did not reside in the
United States.147 Yet, other nations' interest in regulating the offering is not
easy to measure.
Finally, Section 403(2)(h) requires consideration of "the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by other states," which might require an extended
inquiry into foreign law. It is unlikely that prevention of fraudulent sales of
securities would conflict with another state's laws. There could, however, be
different disclosure standards. If a nation does not require disclosure or if
material omissions are not actionable, there could be a conflict.
2. Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd. and
Wagman v. Astle
148
In Roth, a United States shareholder brought an action on behalf of
Dreyfus Corporation, a United States corporation, against Fund of Funds
("FOF"), a Canadian corporation, to recover "short-swing profits" pur-
suant to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.149 FOF was a bene-
ficial owner of more than ten percent of Dreyfus stock and was thus within
provisions of the federal securities laws apply to many transactions which are neither within the
registration requirements nor on organized American markets." Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Secretary of the SEC brought this possibility to the attention of the underwriters.
Id. at 986 n.28.
147. The plaintiff class included "citizens and residents of Canada, Australia, England,
France, Germany, Switzerland, and many other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South
America." Id. at 978.
The liquidation of the various IOS companies and the compensation of defrauded purchasers
were being overseen in part by an informal international committee of regulatory agencies. See
id. at 978 n.4. In a later case involving IOS companies, the Commission argued that in such
cases "victims (whether American or foreign) of international securities fraud cannot be denied
the protections of United States law without jeopardizing future cooperative efforts to combat
international fraud." Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus
Curiae at 5, IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
148. Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975
(1969); Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). These cases are discussed supra
notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
149. Roth, 405 F.2d at 422.
SPRING 1985
458 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the provisions of Section 16(b).150 The purchases and sales by FOF of the
Dreyfus shares were made on the New York Stock Exchange through New
York broker-dealers.
In Wagman, a shareholder brought an action on behalf of Dome Petro-
leum, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, against officers of Dome, also to
recover Section 16(b) "short-swing profits." 5 ' The defendants in Wagman,
as in Roth, were clearly within the proscriptions of Section 16(b). 152 How-
ever, in Wagman the transactions all took place in Canada, although Dome
stock was traded on the American Stock Exchange. All the individual
defendants were citizens and residents of Canada. Unlike Roth, the defen-
dants in Wagman engaged in no transactions or other conduct in the United
States.
a. Current Law
The Roth court found execution of transactions in the United States
through a United States broker-dealer had an effect sufficient to warrant
application of United States law. 5 3 The Wagman court dismissed the case
for lack of personal jurisdiction, but on grounds similar to those used to
determine subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found no conduct or effect
in the United States, rejecting plaintiff's argument that subject-matter
jurisdiction existed because Dome shares were traded on United States
markets. 54
b. The Code
Under Code Section 1905(a)(1)(B), the result would be the same as that
reached by the Roth court. That section applies United States law "with
150. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (application of § 16(b) to Roth defendants).
151. Wagman, 380 F. Supp. at 498-99.
152. The insider defendants in Wagman did not qualify for the exemption from § 16(b)
liability in Securities Exchange Act Rule 3a12-3, 17 C.F.R. 240.3a12-3 (which would have
disposed of the case), because Dome's shares were traded on the American Stock Exchange.
Canadian issuers with exchange-traded securities cannot register them on Form 20-F, see 17
C.F.R. 249.220f, and as a consequence are not exempt under Rule 3a12-3. See infra note 203.
153. The Fund's further argument that ... §16(b) should not be read to apply to
transactions by foreigners in securities of American corporations, although carried
out in the United States, ignores the fact that the effect of this kind of insider trading
is quite as great as when the trader is an American.
Roth, 405 F.2d at 422.
154. The Wagman court acknowledged that trading of the securities in the United States
might be sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the discussion in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc) (reh'g on other grounds), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), see supra text accompanying note 13, but noted that the Schoen-
baum court did not consider the issue of personal jurisdiction. Although the two jurisdictional
tests overlap, the Wagman court said, it nonetheless distinguished Schoenbaum. "[E]ven were
the finding of subject matter jurisdiction to support personal jurisdiction as well, in Schoen-
baum the court was able to point to substantial, actual effects, resulting from acts considered
illegal even abroad. [But] there is in the instant factual situation simply not enough connection
between the individual defendants and this country. ... Wagman, 380 F. Supp. at 502.
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respect to a nonresident of the United States that has a status [under the
Code] to the extent that the Code attaches consequences to such status."
One such status is that of a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of a
class of equity securities of a registrant, and one such consequence is liability
for short-swing profits under the Code's counterpart to Section 16(b).155 The
Code would reverse the Wagman result, because jurisdiction under Section
1905(a)(1)(B) "rests on a person's status rather than his acts" and
"would produce the same result even with respect to purchases and sales
abroad."1 56
c. The Draft Restatement
The Draft Restatement would also yield the same result as in Roth, but for
a different reason. While Roth and the Code confer jurisdiction based on the
effect of insider trading, Section 416(1) of the Draft Restatement would
confer jurisdiction on the basis of conduct, since the transaction was carried
out on a United States market.
Application of the Draft Restatement would be unlikely to alter the
Wagman result. The transactions would fall under Section 416(2), because
they were not carried out on a United States securities market. Section
416(2)(a) would support jurisdiction because securities of the same issuer
(Dome) were traded on the American Stock Exchange. Section 416(2)(c)
might also apply because the persons to be protected include United States
shareholder(s) .157
Even with these links under Section 416(2), however, the full reasonable-
ness analysis of Section 403(2) is required. The links in Section 403(2)(a) and
(b) may be weak because the claimant corporation and the individual
defendants were Canadian and the transactions took place there.1 58 Under
Section 403(2)(c), (e), (f), and (h), it would be relevant, as the Wagman
court observed, that "no other country has a rule such as §16(b), and in fact,
155. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (how ten-percent shareholders come
within § 1905); Code § 1714(a) (providing for recovery by the issuer of any profit realized "by a
person within section 605(a)").
156. Code § 1905 comment 5(a), citing Roth (emphasis in original). The Code's only
reference to Wagman is under § 1905(e), requiring nonresidents to file a consent to United
States jurisdiction. Section 1905(e)(3) comment (2) suggests that jurisdiction would be valid
even without such consent, but cites Wagman as contrary authority.
157. The case was, however, an action on behalf of a Canadian corporation, brought by a
shareholder whose nationality was not specified.
158. See supra note 154. The importance of the plaintiffs' and defendants' citizenship in
Section 16(b) cases is not clear. Both the reasonableness provision, § 403(2)(b), and the
nationality provision, § 402(2), mention the citizenship of the parties. But in an action in which
the shareholders are the named plaintiffs yet the recovery goes to the corporation, a nominal
defendant, the nationality analysis could be difficult. In Schoenbaum, a derivative action under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the court had no trouble in looking beyond the nominal
beneficiary-the Canadian corporation-to the United States shareholders, in order to find a
sufficient effect in the United States. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208.
SPRING 1985
460 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Ontario has explicitly rejected such a rule." 15 9 Under Section 403(2)(d) and
(g), it could be argued that Canadian directors of a Canadian corporation
would expect their conduct to be regulated, if at all, under Canadian law,
especially when they trade securities in Canada.160 Canada certainly would
have an interest in the activities of those who manage Canadian corpora-
tions. In sum, the Section 403(2) factors suggest that the United States
courts should not apply the short-swing profits provisions to the case.
3. The Fidenas Cases1
6 1
In these two cases, the plaintiffs were a Bahamian company, a Swiss
company, and a German citizen who was the managing executive of each.
The alleged fraudulent conduct was the sale by the chief financial officer of
one of the defendant corporations to the plaintiffs of forged promissory
notes purportedly issued by that corporation. In Fidenas I, the plaintiffs
brought an antifraud action against the Swiss corporation which purportedly
issued the notes, as well as several other Swiss and French companies in
various parent-subsidiary relationships, and certain foreign individuals. In
Fidenas II, the plaintiffs substituted United States corporations for the
foreign corporations, moving further up the chain of corporate owner-
ship.162
a. Current Law
In Fidenas I-the case against the foreign companies-the court found
little or no conduct or effects in the United States. 63 The fact that some of
the forged notes were eventually purchased by persons in the United States
was "entitled to little weight in the setting of this case, unlike a class or
derivative action where the group represented includes American 'victims'
or an SEC enforcement proceeding." ' 64 In Fidenas I-the case against the
domestic companies-the court reiterated the holding of Fidenas I, and
noted that neither the effects doctrine nor the conduct doctrine turns on the
159. Wagman, 380 F. Supp. at 501.
160. However, the individual defendants did file securities ownership reports on Form 4 with
the SEC, as required by Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. 78p(a). Wagman, 380 F. Supp. at 499.
Thus, the defendants were arguably aware that United States law governed their conduct.
161. Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull
S.A., 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979) (Fidenas I); Fidenas AG v. Honeywell, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1029
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Fidenas II). These cases are also discussed supra notes 61-64 & 118-119 and
accompanying text.
162. The two defendants in Fidenas II were Honeywell, Inc. and its subsidiary, Honeywell
Information Services, both Delaware corporations headquartered in Minnesota, which par-
tially owned a French company which owned the Swiss corporation which purportedly issued
the forged notes. See Fidenas 1, 606 F.2d at 6.
163. "The events on which plaintiffs rely in order to demonstrate fraudulent activity in the
United States are secondary or tertiary aspects of the fraud at most. Noteworthy also is the
absence of any allegation that these acts were committed by the defendants." Id. at 8.
164. Id.
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nationality of the defendant. 65 The court also discussed and rejected juris-
diction based on the "nationality" doctrine.
166
b. The Code
In both Fidenas cases, the result under the Code would be the same as in
the judicial decisions, due to the absence of a connection between the
transaction and the United States. Under Section 1905(a)(1)(A)(i), a "sale
or purchase of a security" is under United States jurisdiction only if it
"occurs within" the United States. Section 1905(a)(1)(B) does not apply
because none of the nonresident defendants was a registrant, officer, direc-
tor or principal shareholder of a registrant, or had any other status specified
in Section 1902(b). Section 1905(a)(1)(D) provides for jurisdiction under
the effects or conduct doctrines; but here there was no "significant" conduct
or "substantial effect" in the United States. Finally, Section 1905(a)(2)
provides for United States jurisdiction as to conduct that occurs outside the
United States, but only if it is initiated here. There is no indication that the
Fidenas transaction was ever discussed here or concerned the United States
in more than a tangential matter. 67
c. The Draft Restatement
It is conceivable, although unlikely, that the Fidenas cases might be
decided differently under the Draft Restatement. The same effects and
conduct would be insufficient as bases for jurisdiction to prescribe under
Section 402. However, at least in Fidenas I1 where domestic defendants
are involved, Section 416(2)(a) and (c) might offer possible bases for
jurisdiction.1 68 The court would then have to refer to Section 403 to deter-
mine reasonableness, with the probable result that United States law would
not apply. However, the route to the conclusion reached in the Fidenas
cases, straightforward under current law, would be considerably more com-
plicated under the Draft Restatement.' 6
9
165. Fidenas 11, 501 F. Supp. at 1040-41.
166. The court held that the nationality doctrine "has been found insufficient as a basis of
jurisdiction under the securities statutes ... in this circuit." Id. at 1041 (citing Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) and lIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)). Even if the doctrine were viable, the court added, the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated any fraudulent acts by the defendant United States nationals.
Fidenas II, 501 F. Supp. 1041 & n.18. See generally supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text
(discussion of "nationality" doctrine).
167. See supra note 163. The main contact with the United States described by the court was
that plaintiffs, as underwriters, sold some of these notes in the United States. Fidenas 1, 606
F.2d at 7.
168. A jurisdictional basis under § 416(2)(a) would exist because Honeywell's shares are
traded in the United States. And under § 416(2)(c), United States law seeks to protect United
States purchasers, although that factor was discounted by the court in Fidenas 1. See supra text
accompanying note 164.




4. Transnational Activities of Investment Companies
and Investment Advisers
The Investment Company Act of 1940170 and the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940171 impose duties on their respective subjects, relating both to
registration and to other conduct. Investment companies registered or
required to register under the Investment Company Act are subject to
statutory provisions that regulate, among other things, composition of
management and accountability to shareholders, approval of investment
advisory contracts, changes in fundamental investment policies, transac-
tions between the company and affiliated persons, and the company's capi-
tal structure. The Investment Advisers Act includes antifraud provisions,
limitations on advisory compensation, and disclosure and recordkeeping
requirements.
a. Investment Companies
Under Section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act, no foreign invest-
ment company (one not organized under the laws of the United States or
one of its states) may use the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to
offer or sell its securities in a public offering, absent specific Commission
authorization. 72 To grant this authorization, the Commission must find that
"by reason of special circumstances or arrangements, it is both legally and
practically feasible effectively to enforce the provisions of this title against
such company." 173
Thus, foreign investment companies must meet standards not applicable
to other foreign companies selling their shares in the United States. This
stems from the Investment Company Act's unique concern with internal
170. 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 to 80a-64.
171. 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 to 80b-21.
172. Investment Company Act § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. 80a-7(d). As in the Securities and Secur-
ities Exchange Acts, the term "interstate commerce" includes communication "between any
foreign country and any State." Investment Company Act § 2(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(18);
see Securities Act § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. 77b(7), Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(17), 15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(17).
173. Investment Company Act § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. 80a-7(d). The Commission has had
difficulty making this finding regarding non-common-law foreign investment companies. In-
vestment Company Act Rule 7d-1, 17 C.F.R. 270.7d-1, provides specific rules for Canadian
companies, and the Commission has provided guidelines for other foreign companies. See
Investment Company Act Release No. 8959, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,424 (1975). Most recently, the
Commission has recognized that these guidelines may not be sufficient in light of the specific
finding required under the Act, and has suggested that foreign investment companies wishing to
sell shares in the United States form a separate domestic subsidiary rather than attempt to seek
permission to register under §7(d). Investment Company Act Release No. 13691,49 Fed. Reg.
55 (1984).
The Commission has noted that the Investment Company Act's pervasive regulation of
foreign investment companies wishing to sell shares in the United States "presents unnecessary
obstacles," and has recommended legislation amending § 7(d). Id. at 56.
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corporate organization and operation.174 Section 7(d) assures that every
investment company using the jurisdictional means to make a public offer-
ing of its securities is subject to United States law, absent exemption by the
Commission.175 This is the case without regard to the amount of United
States conduct relative to foreign conduct. 76 To be contrasted with Section
7(d) of the Investment Company Act, a specific provision dealing with
foreign companies, are the general provisions of the Securities Act and the
Securities Exchange Act applicable to both foreign and domestic issuers.
Those provisions, as interpreted by the Commission, permit foreign issuers
to use United States mails and commerce to offer and sell securities without
registration so long as the securities do not "come to rest" in the hands of
United States citizens or residents.' 77 In addition, the Commission's inter-
pretation of the Exchange Act relating to foreign broker-dealers permits
them to participate in underwritings in the United States without registra-
tion, so long as their participation is limited to taking down securities for sale
to foreigners outside the United States, and to activities as part of the
underwriting syndicate in the United States which are carried out by a
registered broker-dealer. 78 The Investment Company Act, more than
other securities laws, is a clear expression of Congressional intent to apply
United States law to a foreign investment company which uses the jurisdic-
tional means to offer its securities. Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume that
the Investment Company Act would not apply because international law
might dictate otherwise under the Draft Restatement.
179
174. See, e.g., Investment Company Act § l(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 80a-l(b)(2) (Congressional
finding that companies' internal operations affect "the national public interest and the interest
of investors").
175. See generally Investment Company Act Release No. 13691, 49 Fed. Reg. 55 (1984);
Investment Company Act Release No. 8959, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,424 (1975), discussed supra note
173.
176. However, the relative significance of the conduct or effects in the United States might
be a factor in considering an application for exemption of a person or transaction from any
provision of the Investment Company Act pursuant to the Commission's general exemptive
authority under § 6(c) of the Act. See also Investment Company Act Release No. 6082
(Securities Act Release No. 5068), 35 Fed. Reg. 12,103 (1970) (indicating that disclosure in
compliance with the Securities Act was required with respect to sales by registered investment
companies because "loss of confidence in the integrity of American registered investment
companies could trigger widespread redemptions resulting in losses to foreign and domestic
investors and damage to the United States securities market."). The amount and type of
conduct in the United States may also be relevant in determining whether there has been a
"public offering" within the meaning of Investment Company Act § 7(d).
177. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
178. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7366 (Securities Act Release No. 4708), 29
Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964) (permitting domestic activities of unregistered foreign broker-dealers in
underwriting foreign distributions of securities), and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8907
(Securities Act Release No. 5068), 35 Fed. Reg. 12,103, 12,104-05 (1970) (permitting domestic
activity of unregistered foreign broker-dealers in foreign sale of shares of open-end investment
companies), discussed supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.




There are no provisions in the Investment Advisers Act comparable to
Section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act.' 80 Foreign investment advis-
ers registering in the United States must make only a special service-of-
process undertaking to ensure that United States courts will have personal
jurisdiction over them.1 ' It is therefore feasible to discuss the transnational
application of the Investment Advisers Act, as previous sections of this
subpart have discussed portions of the Securities Exchange Act.
Because there is no case law applying the Investment Advisers Act to
particular transnational situations, this discussion will deal with a hypo-
thetical investment adviser with a predominantly but not exclusively foreign
clientele. 82 At various points in the discussion below, additional qualifica-
tions will be considered: whether the adviser is foreign or domestic, and
whether the adviser is registered under the Act.
i. Current Law. The effects, conduct, and nationality doctrines discussed
earlier have not been applied in reported litigation to the activities of an
investment adviser. But they stand as general doctrines of foreign relations
law, and should be so applied if the situation arose. 83
These doctrines would probably be applied to investment advisers as they
Congressional intent to transcend the limitations of international law which would be set by the
Draft Restatement. See supra note 8. Draft Restatement § 403(4)(b) requires United States
courts to give effect to clear Congressional intent which may go beyond international law,
provided the exercise of such power is within the constitution.
180. Section 203(c)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(c)(1), provides for
registration of investment advisers without regard to nationality. Registration is generally
required if the investment adviser uses interstate or foreign commerce in connection with its
business as an investment adviser. Id. § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(a). An "investment adviser" is
defined in id. § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. 80b-(a)(l 1), as "any person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities,
or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or
reports concerning securities," with exceptions listed in that section and in § 203(b), 15 U.S.C.
80b-3(b). The Commission's Division of Investment Management has taken no-action posi-
tions when foreign unregistered investment advisers use interstate commerce to acquire in-
formation about securities and to effect trades through United States broker-dealers. The
staff's position in these cases has been that such activities do not constitute engagement in the
business of an investment adviser, which consists rather of "the getting of clients and the
providing of advice." Double D. Management, Ltd. (No-Action letter dated Dec. 30, 1982).
181. Investment Advisers Act Rule 0-2, 17 C.F.R. 275.0-2, requires foreign investment
advisers to consent to service of process on the Commission as agent for them in the United
States. See also Rule 204-2(j), 17 C.F.R. 275.204-2(j) (specifying books and records to be
maintained in the United States by nonresident investment advisers).
182. The opposite hypothetical situation-an investment adviser with predominantly
domestic clients-would present fewer problems regarding application of United States law.
This is not to say that such application would be clear in all cases, but that the hypothetical
assumption of a foreign clientele provides a better background for discussion and comparison of
current law, the Code, and the Draft Restatement.
183. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (effects and conduct may be considered in
application of the Investment Company Act).
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are to other persons involved in transnational securities activities. The
Investment Advisers Act, like other federal securities acts, includes
registration' 84 and antifraud 185 provisions. The doctrines developed in other
contexts would apply by analogy in this area. For example, a court could
apply the "export of fraud" doctrine 86 to conduct by a domestic adviser
with predominantly foreign clients, even if most of the fraudulent activities
took place outside the United States.
Assuming that foreign relations law would permit application of United
States law, we must examine the applicable United States law to determine
if Congress intended it to reach this activity.' 87 Analysis under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act depends not on the nationality of the investment adviser,
but on the use of the jurisdictional means and on whether the investment
adviser is registered or required to be registered under the Act. If the
jurisdictional means-interstate or foreign commerce-are used in connec-
tion with the business of an investment adviser, then registration is required,
and the Act applies.' 8 8 It might be possible for a foreign investment adviser
to engage in certain conduct in the United States without being required to
register, but a domestic investment adviser could probably not seek or
provide advice to foreign clients without being required to register' 89 And if
the investment adviser, foreign or domestic, is registered under the Act,
then all its activities everywhere are subject to the Act. 190
184. Investment Advisers Act § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(a), states the general requirement
that investment advisers must register if they use the mails or interstate commerce "in connec-
tion with [their] business as an investment adviser." See supra note 180 (staff interpretation of
this "in connection with" requirement).
185. Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6 and the rules adopted thereunder
proscribe general and specific fraudulent activities by investment advisers.
186. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
187. This is the general approach discussed supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 266. There are certain specific exemptions in Investment Advisers Act
§ 203(b), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b). The Commission also is generally authorized under id. § 206A,
15 U.S.C. 80b-6a, to grant exemptions from the Investment Advisers Act provisions if
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors
and the purposes fairly intended" by the Act.
189. See Double D. Management, Ltd. (No-Action Letter dated Dec. 30, 1982), discussed
supra note 180 (certain activities in the United States are permitted because they are not "in
connection with . . . business as an investment adviser" as required by the Act).
Investment Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)(3), provides an exemption from
the Act's registration requirement for an investment adviser with fewer than 15 clients. In
Alexander, Holburn, Beaudin & Lang (No-Action letter dated July 13, 1984), the Commis-
sion's Division of Investment Management took a no-action position with respect to a Canadian
investment adviser, which had more than 15 clients worldwide, but fewer than 15 clients in the
United States, and was not holding itself out as an investment adviser in the United States. See
infra note 201 (similar distinction under periodic reporting provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act for securities of domestic companies held by less than 300 persons and securities of
foreign companies held by less than 300 United States residents).
190. The Act's prohibitions expressly apply to any activities of registered investment advis-
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ii. The Code. Section 1905(a)(1)(A)(iv) applies the Code to "any activity
as an investment adviser that occurs within the United States although ...
initiated outside the United States." This would provide United States
jurisdiction over the foreign investment adviser with regard to domestic
clients. But depending on where giving advice or obtaining business is held
to "occur," this section may not reach the foreign adviser's activity with
respect to foreign clients. Activity that occurs outside the United States
generally is not subject to the Code, according to Section 1905(b)(1). One
exception is the antifraud provisions, which apply to activity occurring
outside the United States if it is initiated within the United States.
1 91
Similarly, the Code might not reach a domestic adviser with foreign cli-
ents if no fraud is involved. Sections 1905(a)(1)(A)(iv) and 1905(a)(1)(D),
applying the Code to activities in the United States, would not operate if
there would be no sufficient conduct or effects here. Similarly, Section
1905(a)(2) and (b), applying the Code to activities in foreign countries,
would not operate where fraud is not involved.
If an investment adviser is registered with the Commission, then Section
1902(b) applies the Code without regard to the use of the mails or federal
commerce. This rule is applicable to foreign and domestic investment advis-
ers alike.
iii. The Draft Restatement. Under the Draft Restatement, we look first to
the specific securities provisions of Section 416, and then to the general
provisions of Sections 402 and 403. The business of an investment adviser
would not necessarily involve "transactions in securities" at all, and may not
be covered by Section 416.192 If Section 416 does not supply a United States
court with jurisdiction to apply domestic law, then an independent basis
must be found under Section 402. And even if there were sufficient effects or
conduct to serve as a basis for United States jurisdiction under Section 402,
the reasonableness considerations under Section 403 would cast doubt on
application of United States law.'
9 3
ers "irrespective of any use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
in connection therewith." Investment Advisers Act § 203(d), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(d).
See also SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd,
435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970) (provisions of Investment Company Act that refer to registered
companies also apply to companies that should be registered, but are not). The logic of Fifth
Avenue would also apply to the Investment Advisers Act. See, e.g., § 208(a), (c), 15 U.S.C.
80a-8(a), (c). Other sections of the Act apply by their terms to advisers who are not registered
but should be registered, e.g. § 205, 15 U.S.C. 80b-5, which applies to all non-exempt advisers.
191. Code § 1905(a)(2). Code § 1601(a)(4) prohibits fraud in connection with "any activity
or proposed activity by an investment adviser," and incorporates the antifraud provisions of
Investment Advisers Act § 206(1), (2) and (4), 15 U.S.C. 80b-6(1), (2) and (4). This provision is
in Part XVI of the Code, which is applied to acts outside the United States under § 1905(a)(2).
192. For example, advice to hold and not sell a security does not involve "transactions in
securities" but is nonetheless clearly covered by the Investment Advisers Act.
193. The court's reasonableness analysis, pursuant to the factors listed in § 403(2), might
proceed as follows. Under § 403(2)(a) and (b), the general effects and conduct doctrines,
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If the investment adviser is a United States national, it might meet the
effects or conduct test under Section 402 as a result of its nationality.' 9 4 And
the Section 403 reasonableness analysis might not disfavor application of
United States law when a United States national is involved. The impor-
tance of the regulation to the regulating state under Section 403(2)(c), the
"nationality" link under Section 403(2)(b), and the foreign client's "jus-
tified expectation" that United States law would apply under Section
403(2)(d) are somewhat stronger factors with a domestic investment
adviser.
Notwithstanding these considerations with respect to domestic advisers,
application of United States law under the Draft Restatement is doubtful in
cases involving occasional or limited United States activity by any invest-
ment adviser, foreign or domestic. Moreover, the reasonableness analysis
required under Section 403(2) would make each case turn on the specific
parties, facts and nations involved, thus yielding unpredictable results.
Current law and the Code, by contrast, would allow more expansive
application of the Investment Advisers Act, particularly regarding fraudu-
lent activities of advisers. In the investment adviser area, as in the others
discussed earlier, the Draft Restatement could restrict application of United
States law, and the protection that law would give to investors.
5. Periodic Reporting by Foreign Issuers
The Securities Exchange Act requires issuers to register their securities
with the Commission, and to supply holders of their securities with periodic
information, under certain circumstances. If the issuer is a nonresident of
the United States, the Act and the Code contain certain exemptions and
accommodations, which would be different under the Draft Restatement.
a. Current Law
Unlike the application of antifraud law, the application of the Exchange
Act registration and periodic reporting obligations has been determined
minimal effects or conduct would be factors against the reasonableness of application of United
States law. Section 403(2(c) looks at the importance of regulation to the United States; a court
might find that the United States interest is outweighed by foreign interests in the case of an
investment adviser with predominantly foreign clients. See supra note 189 (Alexander, Holburn
no-action position). Section 403(2)(d) looks to the parties' "justified expectations"; if both
parties are foreign, it is unclear what their expectations would be. These results might be
different if the adviser's clients were United States citizens. Section 403(2)(e) and (f) examine
the relative and traditional importance of investment-adviser regulation in a world-wide
context; the Act's provisions might be considered too pervasive and intrusive when applied to
an essentially foreign business. Sections 403(2)(g) and (h) require specific comparison of the
foreign state's law and the Act; this is difficult to apply hypothetically.
194. Alternatively, if § 416 provides a basis for jurisdiction over the domestic investment
adviser, nationally could be the basis of a relevant link under § 416(2)(b) (representations or




administratively, not through frequent litigation under doctrines of interna-
tional law. The rationale for application of these laws is thus less clear, but
the mechanics of that application are not.
Periodic reporting to shareholders is required of issuers under the Act in
three circumstances: (1) if an issuer files a registration statement for an
offering under the Securities Act, which subsequently becomes effective; 195
(2) if an issuer has its securities traded on a national securities exchange; 196
or (3) if an issuer has more than $3 million in total assets and more than 500
holders of any class of equity securities.1 97 These provisions cover foreign as
well as domestic issuers. Although the Commission has made certain mod-
ifications to accommodate foreign issuers, the statutory reporting require-
ments are designed to insure that there is adequate disclosure from all
issuers to protect the investing public.
The Commission's rules distinguish between foreign issuers that have
voluntarily gained access to the United States securities markets, either by
issuing securities here or by trading on a national exchange or automated
quotation system,' 9s and those foreign issuers that are involuntarily sub-
jected to the reporting requirements under the asset and shareholder
standard.' 99 Certain foreign private issuers200 are exempted from registra-
tion under Exchange Act Section 12(g) if they furnish to the Commission all
public filings and reports that are required "pursuant to the law of the
country of [their] domicile or in which [they are] incorporated or orga-
nized," or that are filed with an exchange, or sent to security holders.20  This
195. Securities Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. 77o(d).
196. Id. § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. 771(b).
197. Id. § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. 771(g); Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-
1. Section 12(g) registration is required of issuers "engaged in interstate commerce, or in a
business affecting interstate commerce," or whose securities are traded in interstate commerce.
198. The Commission has treated trading on an automated quotation system such as
NASDAQ as equivalent to trading on an exchange for these purposes. See supra text accom-
panying notes 71-72.
199. Foreign private issuers, defined supra note 68, become subject to § 12(g) reporting
requirements by meeting the asset, shareholder, and commerce test. See supra note 197. This
can be completely involuntary on the part of the foreign issuer, as when the issuer's sharehold-
ers sell to United States residents.
200. See supra note 68 for the definition of a foreign private issuer.
201. Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2(b)(1). The exemp-
tion under Rule 12g3-2(b) is not available to an issuer who has had any other § 12 registration in
the past eighteen months, or has an obligation to report under § 15, i.e. has had an effective
registration under the Securities Act at any time, or whose securities are quoted on an
"automated inter-dealer quotation system." Issuers can continue to use this exemption if their
securities were quoted on such a system (such as NASDAQ) in October 1983 and have been
continuously traded since, and they continue to furnish the required information. For Canadian
issuers, this "grandfathering" applies only through 1985. Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g3-
2(d)(1)-(3), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2(d)(1)-(3).
Securities of foreign private issuers are also exempt from the registration requirements under
Exchange Act § 12(g) and the issuer is suspended from any reporting obligation under § 15(d) if
the securities are held by fewer than 300 United States residents. Securities Exchange Act Rules
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exemption is intended to apply where disclosure is already made under
202other laws or practices. In addition, foreign private issuers are generally
exempted from requirements relating to shareholder communications and
to trading by officers, directors, and substantial shareholders. 20 3
b. The Code
The Code provisions essentially parallel current law. The voluntary en-
trants into United States markets would be covered as "registrants" under
Section 1905(a)(1)(B). 20 4
Involuntary entrants are not explicitly covered by Section 1905. Gen-
eral periodic reporting about the issuer-except in proxies, tender offers, or
other shareholder communication-is not covered by Section
1905(a)(1)(A). Nonregistered involuntary entrants have no relevant "sta-
tus" covered by Section 1905(a)(1)(B). The only other relevant provision is
Section 1905(a)(1)(D), the familiar effects and conduct doctrines. 20 5 It could
be argued under either doctrine that United States law can apply to regulate
the trading in this country of securities of issuers about which current,
accurate, and complete information is not publicly available. But such issues
have not been litigated, and domestic law provides many exemptions from
registration .206
As under current law, involuntary entrants are specifically covered by
domestic law under the Code. Section 402 requires registration of all "per-
sons" with more than $1 million in assets and 500 security holders.0 7 And
Section 1902(c), the "jurisdictional means" provision, directs that the Code
applies if the person's acts involve "Federal commerce. "208 Thus, as in
current law, the Code substitutes an "interstate commerce" test under
Section 1902 for any foreign relations analysis under Section 1905, with the
12g3-2(a) and 12g-4(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2(a), 240.12g-4(a)(2). This is not based on any
principle of international law, but is a de minimis exception which applies in a similar fashion to
domestic issuers. See id. Rule 12g-4(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-4(a)(1) (exemption from §12(g)
reporting); id. Rule 12h-3, 17 C.F.R. 240.12h-3 (suspension of § 15(d) reporting obligation).
202. The Rule is intended to require information "material to an investment decision," such
as financial condition and changes in business. Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b)(3), 17
C.F.R. 240.12g3-2(b)(3).
203. Issuers of securities which may be registered on Form 20-F (all non-Canadian foreign
private issuers, and certain Canadian issuers described in 17 C.F.R. 249.2200 are exempt from
Securities Exchange Act 88 14(a)-(c), (f), and 16, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a)-(c), (f), 78p. Securities
Exchange Act Rule 3a12-3(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.3a12-3(b).
204. See Code §8 202(137), 402(a) and 403 (definition of "registrant" and application of that
definition to offering statements and periodic reports).
205. See supra text accompanying note 84.
206. Under Code §§ 404 and 1905(c), as under current law, the Commission retains consider-
able discretion in requiring periodic reporting.
207. The Code requires registration of issuers, not securities. See Code § 402(a) comment 1.




result that a foreign issuer with a few shareholders in the United States could
be involuntarily subject to the periodic reporting requirements, absent some
exemption provided by the Commission, irrespective of the effects, conduct
or nationality doctrines of foreign relations law.
c. The Draft Restatement
Analysis of the Draft Restatement with respect to the periodic reporting
requirements may not be necessary, as Congress has expressed an overrid-
ing intent regarding those requirements. Such intent is recognized as con-
trolling under the Draft.0 9 In 1964, Congress specifically considered ap-
plication of the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act to
foreign issuers. By providing statutory coverage of all issuers involved in
interstate commerce which meet specified shareholder and asset levels and
granting the Commission exemptive power, Congress demonstrated its
intent as to the jurisdictional scope of the reporting provisions.2 10 That
intent should be honored regardless of the limits of international law, and
the commentary to the Draft should so state. Absent such a statement, it is
possible that courts, explicitly required to determine Congressional intent
under the Draft Restatement, will reach a narrow construction unduly
restricting application of the registration and reporting requirements.
The Draft Restatement's securities law provision, Section 416, does not
mention jurisdiction with respect to matters which are not "transactions in
securities." Therefore, jurisdiction would be available, if at all, under
Sections 402 and 403. Since the reporting requirements for voluntary en-
trants are based on status, Section 402 would be difficult to apply to foreign
issuers. Their status is a consequence of previous conduct (an offering of
securities or listing on an exchange), and thus Section 402(1)(a) may be
inapplicable.2t' Section 402(1)(b) would also be inapplicable, because it
requires that persons having the particular status be "present within the
territory." Section 402(1)(c), however, could apply where a substantial
effect within the United States could be shown, e.g., the harm to domestic
shareholders buying and selling without the benefit of current, accurate, and
complete information about the issuer.
If Section 402 were satisfied, then the Section 403(2) reasonableness
factors would have to be considered. On balance, the factors in Section
403(2) suggest that the United States would not have jurisdiction to impose
reporting requirements on foreign issuers, particularly if they differ from the
regulations of the issuer's country. The strong interest of the United States
209. Draft Restatement § 403(4)(b), discussed infra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 17,799 (1964).
211. On the other hand, registrant status based on exchange listing maybe viewed as resting
on continuing conduct-trading on the exchange.
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in protecting domestic markets and investors, recognized in Section
403(2)(a)-(b), may not be sufficient when balanced, under the remaining
provisions of Section 403(2), with the interests of various other states in
which the issuer's securities may be traded.212
Therefore, the Draft Restatement could disrupt current law, which is
based on a broad assumption of authority to regulate and the discretionary
granting of exemptions. Under the Draft Restatement, unlike the Code or
current law, it is possible that decisions to apply the registration and report-
ing requirements to foreign issuers would be made by courts as a matter of
international law, rather than by the Commission as a limited exemption
from otherwise applicable domestic law.
II. Problems in Draft Restatement's Approach to
Jurisdiction
The Draft Restatement would narrow the limits of international law and
curtail the application of United States securities laws to transnational
activities. Yet it is essential that the United States securities laws apply
whenever necessary to fulfill their purposes. This is increasingly important
for United States investors and for foreign investors trading in United States
markets, because trading in those markets is more frequently international
in scope. The Draft Restatement does not provide sufficiently broad United
States jurisdiction. On the contrary, it would alter fundamentally the cur-
rent approach to jurisdiction, creating extensive uncertainty and possibly an
actual conflict between international law and the interpretation of the
securities laws necessary to protect this country's interests. The uncertainty
is itself troublesome even in those cases where the outcome of the jurisdic-
tional inquiry would ultimately be the same under the Draft and present law.
A. DRAFr RESTATEMENT SEcTiONs 402 AND 403
As illustrated in the cases discussed above, under existing law the federal
securities statutes, particularly the antifraud provisions, are broadly applied
212. Under the factors in Draft Restatement §§ 403(2)(c)-(f), no general evaluations can be
made. The laws of certain countries may indicate a significant interest in periodic reporting by
their resident corporations. Where that is the case, the Draft Restatement may look to foreign
law.
The Section 403(2) factors are reflected in current law by the Commission's exemption for
certain foreign private issuers from the reporting, shareholder communication and short-swing
trading provisions of Securities Exchange Act §§ 12(g), 14(a)-(c), (f), 15(d), and 16, 15 U.S.C.
781(g), 78n(a)-(c), (f), 78o(d), and 78p. See Securities Exchange Act Rules 3a12-3 and
12g3-2(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.3a12-3, 240.12g3-2(a), discussed supra notes 201 & 203 and accom-
panying text. Current law also defers to foreign regulation by permitting certain foreign issuers
to furnish to the Commission information required by foreign authorities. See Securities




to transnational activities. The analysis required under present law is not
extremely complicated. The Federal Securities Code, by codifying much of
the current judicial interpretation concerning the application of United
States securities laws to transnational activities, would further simplify the
necessary analysis.
1. Draft's Reasonableness Inquiry is Uncertain
The Draft Restatement would remove the certainty of current law. All
securities activities, except transactions carried out or intended to be carried
out on a United States market, would be subjected to a wide-ranging and
necessarily subjective "reasonableness" inquiry to determine if jurisdiction
is permitted under international law. The reasonableness factors of Sections
403(2)(c)-(h) 213 represent a value judgment by the reporters rather than a
restatement of foreign relations law.
In addition to the many interpretive difficulties involved in applying the
non-exclusive reasonableness factors set out in Section 403(2), the critical
balancing process is left to individual determination. The results under such
a system must vary depending on the decision-maker, and the existence of
jurisdiction will be difficult, if not virtually impossible, to predict. The new
factors and analysis introduced by the Draft Restatement would encourage
parties to litigate jurisdictional issues that are settled under current law.
2. Draft's Analysis Unduly Restrictive
Although the results under the reasonableness analysis would be uncer-
tain, the general thrust of the Draft Restatement provisions is away from
expanded or continued application of United States law in situations where
that result is now accepted. This is implicit in certain of the "reasonable-
ness" factors in the Draft Restatement.21 4
The complex analysis under the Draft Restatement casts doubt upon most
of the currently-accepted bases of subject-matter jurisdiction. Under the
effects doctrine, it would no longer suffice under the Draft, as under current
law, that "fraudulent acts relating to securities which are committed abroad
result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the
United States has an interest, 215 or that there was "impairment of the value
of American investments by sales by the issuer in a foreign country, alleg-
edly in violation of the [Securities Exchange] Act."' 216 And under the
213. See supra note 117 for a listing of these factors.
214. See, e.g., "the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic
system" (§ 403(2)(e)), "the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity" (§ 403(2)(g)), and "the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states"
(§ 403(2)(h)).
215. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974,989 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975); see supra notes 138-147 and accompanying text.
216. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.), 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc) (reh. on other grounds), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
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conduct doctrine, the Draft appears to attach little importance to this
country's interest in preventing the use of its territory as a base for exporting
fraud to other nations. 217 The businesses of this country utilize capital
invested by foreign, as well as domestic, investors. If the United States is to
encourage investment by citizens of other nations, it must be able to assure
that this country will not be used as a base for fraud; this country must be
able to assure foreign investors that the protections against fraud applicable
to wholly domestic transactions will be applied to protect them when they
invest in the United States.218 Moreover, if we fail to provide needed
protections for foreign citizens, their nations will be less likely to provide
needed protections for Americans injured by conduct abroad. 219
The Draft Restatement would increase the burden of the party seeking to
apply United States law. Establishing "reasonableness" and conducting a
far-reaching investigation into the law of various nations seem to be duties of
the party seeking to establish jurisdiction. This would place unwarranted
practical and financial hardships on the federal government and those
private parties who sought to apply United States securities law.
The Draft Restatement's limitations on jurisdiction do not apply in the
face of "clear" Congressional intent to subject a transaction or person to
United States law, 220 which would, in certain areas, limit any undue con-
straint by the Draft Restatement on the operations of the securities laws.
However, courts would be forced in more cases to analyze Congressional
intent in order to apply United States law. And it is entirely possible that
courts would be unwilling to imply such Congressional intent.
221
217. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text; Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421
(9th Cir. 1983).
218. See supra notes 58, 60 (doctrine of preventing export of fraud from the United States to
foreign investors).
219. For a discussion of potential adverse reciprocal treatment in other countries, see
Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir.
1978), discussed supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text, citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109,
116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017
(2d Cir. 1975), discussed supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
220. Draft Restatement § 403(4)(b). The assertion of United States law must, of course, still
be within Congress' constitutional powers. Id. Several such provisions exist in current law. For
example, §§ 12 and 15 of the Securities Exchange Act indicate Congress' intent to subject every
issuer involved in interstate commerce and meeting certain asset, shareholder, or trading
requirements to the periodic reporting requirements of the Act. See supra text accompanying
notes 209-210. Congress also required explicitly that the Commission find that the Investment
Company Act's provisions could, as a practical matter, be applied to foreign investment
companies before allowing them to trade their shares in the United States. See Investment
Company Act § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. 80a-7(d), discussed supra notes 172-173 and accompanying
text.
221. See Draft Restatement § 403 comment f (applying "the general principle that courts will
seek to interpret acts of Congress to avoid conflict with international law").
SPRING 1985
474 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
3. Draft's Shift in Analysis not Justified
The comments to the Draft in general assume that current analysis is
deficient and that there is some problem warranting a change in the current
approach to transnational jurisdiction. 2  Yet the Draft does not document
any such problem in the securities area. Indeed, the comments acknowledge
that ordinary use of the effects or conduct tests is noncontroversial.223 There
is some controversy regarding use of the effects doctrine based on the
economic impact of foreign activity within this country,224 but that does not
justify limiting conduct-based jurisdiction, such as the "export-of-fraud"
doctrine. 225 Such assertions of United States jurisdiction have been recog-
nized as appropriate and helpful in the international community,2 2 6 contrary
to the charge of the Draft Restatement that Commission actions are "caus-
ing annoyance and provoking resentment abroad. '2 27 The Commission,
along with the courts, has continued to develop existing law in response to
new problems.228
The requirements of the Draft Restatement may offend rather than
accommodate foreign governments and their interests. For example, Sec-
tion 403(2)(g) and (h) would require.United States courts to evaluate the
interests of other states in regulating certain activities. Many foreign nations
would take offense at such an attempt by the United States to judge their
222. The major "problem" identified by the Draft is the conflicting assertion by different
nations of jurisdiction to prescribe and apply their laws. The Draft asserts that the emerging
rules of the modern world, attempting to solve this problem, have produced "reasonableness"
analysis. See Draft Restatement pt. IV, c.1, introductory note at 92.
223. See Draft Restatement § 402 comment a; id. § 403 reporters' note 3.
224. See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).
225. See text accompanying note 49.
226. See Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws to International Securities Transac-
tions, 45 ALBANY L. REV. 890, 930-31 (1981); Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 566-67 (1976). The intent of the "export-of-fraud"
doctrine referred to above and discussed supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text, is to
encourage favorable reciprocal treatment of similar situations in foreign courts, see supra note
136 and accompanying text.
227. See Draft Restatement, Part IV, c. 1, introductory note at 91 n.5. Specific examples
cited in the Draft of situations where application of United States law has been particularly
controversial usually involve the antitrust laws, id. (United States investigation into European
industry cartels), or the use of certain methods to compel testimony or the production of
documents abroad. As an example in the securities area, the Draft cites Widmer, The U.S.
Securities Laws-Banking Law of the World?, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 39 (1978).
Widmer's main criticism of Commission action is the potential application of broker-dealer
regulations to foreign banks while United States banks remain exempt. Id at 42. See generally
Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies: Hearings Before the Perm.
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 134-47 (1983) (testimony of Commission Enforcement Director John M. Fedders).
228. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2 (periodic
reporting rules for foreign private issuers); Investment Company Act Release No. 13691, 49
Fed. Reg. 55 (1984) (advice to foreign investment companies seeking to issue shares in the
United States, and proposing remedial legislation).
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laws and national interests. To the extent that the Draft Restatement would
create uncertainty, engender litigation, and force courts to make more
decisions on such questions, problems with foreign countries will be exacer-
bated rather than alleviated.229
4. Draft's Approach is Inconsistent with A LI-Approved Code
The Draft's unjustified departure from current law is troublesome apart
from the Federal Securities Code. But the American Law Institute's ap-
proval of the Code and its endorsement by the Commission exacerbate the
problems with the Draft. As the reporters for the Draft recognize, the
language of Section 1905 of the Code confines its scope to the limits of
international law. 230 If the Draft Restatement were accepted as the embodi-
ment of the limits of international law, the codification of transnational
jurisdiction in Section 1905 of the Code could be undermined in large part.
The detailed provisions of Section 1905 could be irrelevant in many in-
stances because of the narrower scope of jurisdiction prescribed by the Draft
Restatement.
B. DRAFr RESTATEMENT SECTION 416
Section 416 is intended to "illustrate" the application of the Draft Re-
statement in the context of the United States securities law.23 ' Its illustra-
tions, however, do not include many possible applications of United States
law to transnational activities. Under Section 416, United States law applies
with certainty only in the case of securities transactions on a market in the
United States. 232 Other transactions must be analyzed under the reason-
ableness provisions of Section 403.233 This narrow focus on transactions on a
securities market overlooks the importance of securities regulation in a
variety of other contexts, such as periodic reporting to shareholders, proxies
and tender offers, and the activities of investment companies and invest-
ment advisers. The failure to address these areas in Section 416 means that
229. Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L
Bus. 1147, 1152 (1983).
230. Draft Restatement § 416 reporters' note 6; see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying
text.
231. Id. § 403 comment g.
232. Id. § 416(1). The Draft does not define the term "market." Presumably, this would
include both exchanges and the over-the-counter markets. This should be clarified, since
substantial trading takes place over the counter. See Securities Act Release No. 6493, 48 Fed.
Reg. 46,736, 46,737 n.4 (1983) (NASDAQ average daily volume for first half of 1983 was
three-fourths of NYSE volume and nearly seven times the Amex volume.) Even original
offerings under the Securities Act may not be encompassed in the "trading on a market"
terminology of § 416(1).
233. Draft Restatement § 416(2).
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they are to be treated under Sections 402 and 403; therefore, the cumber-
some and uncertain reasonableness inquiry would be required in every case.
In addition, Section 416(2) creates a presumption against United States
jurisdiction unless one of three narrowly-drawn links is present.2 34 These
links enumerate but a few of the bases upon which current judicial analysis
has relied to find United States jurisdiction. 235 This is especially true under
Section 416(2)(b), which lists only "negotiations" and "representations" as
significant elements in cases not involving securities traded on a United
States market or cases not involving United States companies, registrants,
issuers or traders. 236
C. DRAFT RESTATEMENT SECTION 418
Section 418 limits United States jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries and
branches of United States corporations. Its impact on the securities laws is
uncertain, because the Section's broad prohibitions on application of
United States law apply only under narrow circumstances. Section 418
applies only when nationality is the sole basis for jurisdiction over a foreign
subsidiary or branch of a United States corporation. It would not apply, for
example, if there were conduct or effects sufficient for United States juris-
diction to be reasonable under Section 403.237 In addition, Section 418
would not apply in the specific contexts covered by other sections of the
Draft Restatement, such as Section 416 governing transactions on a secu-
rities market.238
Although Section 418 may be limited in its application, the conse-
quences of that application could be substantial. The United States may
regulate subsidiaries of United States corporations only if that exercise of
authority is part of a program of regulation dependent for its success on that
239exercise. In addition, the section would flatly prohibit United States
234. Draft Restatement § 416 comment c.
235. The drafters note that these three "links" are not intended to be exclusive. Id. § 416
comment c and reporters' note 5. However, they do not indicate why these three areas are of
primary importance.
236. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975), where the court found
"an abundance of American activity," none of which apparently falls within § 416(2)(b).
Vencap is analyzed by the drafters under § 416(2)(c) "nationality" principles. Draft Restate-
ment § 416 reporters' note 3. See also SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 938 (1977) (United States offices, drafting of agreements, keeping books and records
and transmittal of proceeds held sufficient to establish jurisdiction; no particular emphasis on
negotiations alone).
237. See supra note 107.
238. Draft Restatement §418 comment a. Thus, the exception from coverage under § 418 is
only as broad as the coverage under §416. Because of § 416's narrow focus on securities
transactions, see supra text accompanying notes 232-236, § 418's exception for the federal
securities laws as covered by other sections would also be narrow.
239. Draft Restatement § 418(3)(b), applying to foreign corporations controlled by United
States persons or corporations. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction where it would create a conflict with the law of "the state where
the branch or corporation is organized or is doing business,, 2 40 or if the
conduct regulated is "predominantly local."' 24 1 The commentary suggests
several supposedly "noncontroversial" "predominantly local" subjects,
such as conditions of employment for non-United States citizens, and in-
dustrial and labor relations;242 but there can easily be controversy 243 when
United States regulatory provisions are applied to foreign operations.
244
Finally, the commentary to Section 418 requires clear congressional in-
tent before United States law is applied to foreign branches or subsidiaries
because the parent is a United States national. 245 This appears to add a
requirement to the text of Section 418, and the drafters do not state ex-
plicitly what would suffice as "clear" intent.246 It is thus uncertain whether
Section 418 might limit the application of certain provisions of the securities
laws.247
III. Problems in Draft Restatement's Procedural and
Sanctions Provisions
Once a court has proper jurisdiction-either "subject-matter juris-
diction ' 248 under current law, or "jurisdiction to prescribe, 249 under the
Draft Restatement-it may apply United States law to the case before it. In
240. Id. § 418(4)(a). Comments to this section notes that primary jurisdiction would exist
where the corporation was doing business rather than where it was organized.
241. Id. § 418(4)(b), applying to foreign corporations controlled by United States persons or
corporations and to foreign branches of United States corporations. See supra notes 108-110
and accompanying text.
242. Id. § 418 comment f.
243. For example, if a foreign labor union could demand participation on a board of
directors which is otherwise elected by the shareholders under United States law, could the
union-affiliated board members be held to United States legal standards for directors? Or, a
United States broker-dealer may be required to discharge an employee for violation of a New
York Stock Exchange rule in conduct off the exchange, while the "local" law would not
recognize that conduct as an infraction giving cause for termination.
244. "The interests which are asserted in a foreign subsidiary conflict are usually related to
national security or sovereignty, areas in which a state will be less likely to defer to the interests
of another state." Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate
and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 319, 383 (1983).
245. Draft Restatement § 418 comment g.
246. See supra note 112.
247. See, e.g., § 203(d) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(d),
discussed supra note 190 and accompanying text. The statute does not explicitly refer to foreign
entities, although foreigners may register as investment advisers; see supra notes 180-181 and
accompanying text. It is uncertain whether the Act conveys sufficiently "clear" intent within the
meaning of Draft Section 418.
248. Courts usually speak of "subject matter" jurisdiction, although this is not strictly
accurate. See supra note 9. The decisions discussed in Parts I and I combine doctrines of
subject-matter jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction, venue, and conflict-of-laws doctrines.
249. See Draft Restatement § 401(1).
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some cases, however, international law will require a court to stay its hand in
proceedings otherwise properly before it, if the court's orders under United
States law would leave a party to the litigation with contrary obligations
under the applicable laws of a different state. This is known as the "foreign
government compulsion" defense to proceedings in the forum state. In
other cases, international law may deny the court power to proceed with a
case properly before it because the parties were not given notice or oppor-
tunity to be heard. The Draft Restatement has provisions in each of these
areas. Sections 419 and 420 cover the foreign government compulsion
defense generally (Section 419) and in the specific context of production of
documents or other information (Section 420). Section 431 covers the
"fundamental fairness" required in any court or agency enforcement pro-
ceeding.
A. DRAFT RESTATEMENT SECTIONS 419 AND 420
"Foreign government compulsion" is defined by the Draft Restatement
as existing "when two states having jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to a
person issue contradictory commands." 250 This situation most frequently
results in the securities area when a party subject to a court's discovery order
raises a foreign secrecy 251 or blocking 252 statute as a defense. This subpart
first summarizes current law in this area, and then critically reviews the
Draft Restatement's treatment.
1. Current Law
In the leading foreign government compulsion case, the Supreme Court
stated that a substantive conflict with foreign law does not per se prevent
United States action. 253 If the United States court has jurisdiction to consid-
er the litigation, the generally accepted approach in this country is that the
court has jurisdiction to require production of evidence and compliance with
250. Id. § 419 comment a.
251. A secrecy law makes it illegal for a holder of certain information (typically a bank) to
disclose that information without the subject's (typically a bank customer) consent. It is most
commonly encountered in the securities area when banks refuse to disclose the identities and
actions of their customers tr.ding in securities through nominee accounts. See SEC v. Banca
della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1386 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (Bank of Nova Scotia I) (Bahamian bank secrecy law raised
as defense in tax and narcotics investigations).
252. A blocking statute prevents the removal of any information from the country, or
compliance with particular judgments inside the enacting state's jurisdiction. Unlike the
secrecy laws, blocking statutes are not intended to protect the relationships or types of
information involved, but rather represent foreign refusal to comply with United States
policies, procedures, or laws. See Draft Restatement § 420 reporters' note 1.
253. Societe International pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958).
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its judgments, regardless of the existence of contravening foreign law.254
However, even though United States law applies, the good-faith efforts of
the party required to make disclosure to avoid the foreign blocking or
secrecy statutes may preclude the imposition of certain sanctions.255 The
courts have considered foreign secrecy and blocking statutes as equitable
defenses, under either the current Restatement 2 5 6  or the Draft
Restatement, 257 to determine the propriety of compulsion to enforce the
United States order or judgment. The current Restatement directs the court
to balance the national interests involved, the hardship imposed on the party
required to disclose, the location of performance, the nationality of the
party, and the efficacy of disclosure. 258 The Draft Restatement indicates the
factors a court should consider "[i]n issuing an order directing production of
documents or other information located abroad": the information's impor-
tance to the case, the specificity of the request, where the documents
originated, relevant interests of the state where the documents or informa-
tion are now located, and the existence of any alternative means of securing
the information.2 59
254. Id. at 211. "The strength of the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to
ensure the integrity of its financial markets cannot seriously be doubted .... It would be a
travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American markets, violate American
laws . . . , and resist accountability ... by claiming [its] anonymity under foreign law." SEC
v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 114, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
255. SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 114. Good faith nonetheless does
not bar drawing adverse inferences against a nonproducing party. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc.,
101 F.R.D. 503, 509-10, 516 (N.D. I11. 1984). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, No. 83-1(WPB) GJ, slip op. at 15 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1984),
(Bank of Nova Scotia 111), on remand from 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983) (Bank of Nova Scotia
I), aff'd, 740 F.2d 817 (11 th Cir. 1984) (findings of fact, including lack of good-faith effort to
produce documents); and United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346
(7th Cir. 1983) (remanded to district court for findings on the "good-faith" issue).
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965) (current Restatement).
257. Draft Restatement § 420(1)(c).
258. See United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345-46 (7th Cir.
1983) (Greek bank secrecy law); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1331-32 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981) (Swiss business secrets act); In re Westinghouse
Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, 563 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1977) (Ontario
uranium industry blocking statute); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532
F.2d 404, 407-09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976) (Cayman Islands bank secrecy
law); United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080, 1085-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (Hong Kong bank secrecy law); SEC v. Banca Svizzera della Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111,
117-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Swiss bank secrecy law).
259. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). Some of these factors were taken from United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d at 1332-33.
See also Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1388 (citing Draft Restatement reporters' concern for
international friction, but relying on executive and legislative branches to resolve); Graco, Inc.
v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. at 516 (applying Draft Restatement factors, ordering compliance
with discovery request despite assertion of French blocking statute); United States v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158, 1162-63 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (citing Draft Restatement factors;
IRS summonses held valid).
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The case law in the United States interpreting these requirements prop-
erly accommodates valid foreign restraints. United States subpoenas are
enforced overseas only when a legitimate reason for such enforcement
exists. For example, in United States v. Vetco, Inc.,260 the court, although
refusing to give effect to foreign prohibitions on document production in an
official investigation for tax fraud, observed that
[t]o the extent that some hardship is imposed on appellants, it was avoidable.
I.R.C. 3964(c) requires an American corporation to keep records pertaining to its
controlled foreign corporations sufficient to enable a determination as to whether
... [the tax at issue] is due. 261
After reviewing all alternatives to an enforcement order and finding them
wanting, the court stated that, since appellants had not shown that a "signifi-
cant hardship" would result from enforcement, it would affirm enforcement
of the I.R.S. summons. 262 Similarly, in United States v. Toyota Motor
Corp.,263 a Japanese corporation and its American subsidiary argued that
they should not be required to produce cost figures pursuant to an I.R.S.
subpoena because of "principles of international law." 264 In response, the
court noted that the summons request for cost data was specific, relevant,
and important to the I.R.S. audit, that the United States-Japan tax treaty
had been ineffective in providing data, and that Japan would not accept or
honor United States letters rogatory.2 65 And in United States v. First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago,2 6 6 the court, applying Restatement principles,
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether to require the
defendant in an I.R.S. subpoena enforcement action to seek in good faith an
exemption from the bank secrecy statute at issue.267
260. 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
261. Id. at 1332.
262. Id. at 1333.
263. 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
264. Id. at 1162.
265. Id. at 1162-63. The government of Japan had also suggested that enforcement of the
subpoena would eventually lead to Toyota's double taxation. The court found no substantive
conflict of law, noting that the tax treaty provided a means to eliminate double taxation, and
ordered enforcement of the summons. Id. at 1163-64.
266. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
267. The court in that case applied the balancing test of § 40 of the current Restatement,
discussed supra text accompanying note 258, but added that that analysis is reflected "with
some modification" in §§ 403, 419 and 420 of the Draft Restatement. First National, 699 F.2d at
346. The court held that such a good-faith attempt to obtain an exemption may be required
under Draft Restatement § 420(2). It distinguished Nova Scotia I, which affirmed a civil
contempt for failure to comply with a grand jury subpoena enforcement order. In Nova Scotia 1,
noted the court, "the court of appeals had the benefit of findings by the distict court.., that the
bank had not made a good faith effort to comply with the subpoena." First National, 699 F.2d at
346-47.
The holding of First National may prove troublesome if it alters the burden of quantum of
proof in subpoena enforcement actions or discovery requests. It would be inappropriate to
require the Commission, or any other administrative agency, which is entitled to a presumption
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2. Coverage of Sections 419 and 420
Sections 419 and 420 of the Draft Restatement both address the "foreign
government compulsion" defense. Section 419 is a jurisdictional provision
dealing generally with conflicting compulsions of different governments, as
an application of Section 403(3).268 Section 420, also applying Section
403(3),269 deals with production of documents or other information located
abroad. It is not a jurisdictional provision, but rather assumes that a given
case is properly before a United States court. Section 420(1) provides that
the United States court may order production of documents and things
located abroad, that the court may impose sanctions for not so doing, and
that the court should consider certain factors before imposing sanctions.270
Section 420(2) would govern when the law of the state where the informa-
tion is located prohibits disclosure. The United States court could still
require a "good-faith effort" by the party to produce the information, but
could impose only less severe sanctions for noncompliance.
The two sections overlap somewhat in their coverage. Section 419 deals
mainly with compulsion, and Section 420 mainly with production of infor-
mation; hence, either could apply to compelled production of information in
opposition to foreign secrecy or blocking statutes. The drafters have re-
solved this overlap by analyzing both secrecy and blocking statute defenses
under Section 420.271
3. Section 420 Imposes Impediments to
Application of United States Law
Section 420 would not insulate a party from liability for failure to produce
documents or other information merely because a conflict exists. 272
Nonetheless, the Section's procedural requirements reinforce its bias
against application of United States law.
Section 420(1)(a) would require, in every case, a United States court
order for production of any information located abroad, rather than permit-
ting use of court rules of discovery or the mechanisms of administrative
discovery. The Draft would require court participation to ensure that re-
quests for information, particularly those made by private litigants, are
consistent with the "long-term national . . . interests" and "international
understandings." 273 However, in the case of administrative litigation, the
of propriety in its investigation or prosecution of a case, to include the extensive data described
in the § 420(1)(c) balancing test to meet its burden of proof and persuasion in every subpoena
enforcement action or discovery request. In First National, the court of appeals requested a
finding on the issue of good faith-effectively making a showing of the lack of good faith an
element of the government's burden of proof.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 121-124 for a discussion of the provisions of § 419.
269. Draft Restatement § 420 comment d.
270. See supra text accompanying note 259, listing the factors to be considered.
271. Draft Restatement § 420 comment d; see also id. § 419 comment a.
272. Id. § 420 reporters' note 4.
273. Id. § 420 reporters' note 8.
SPRING 1985
482 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
agency charged with administration of the pertinent statutes should be
able to make an adequate determination as to the interests involved.2 74 In
suggesting that agencies may not always make a proper evaluation, 275 the
drafters ignore the strong presumption of regularity in agency action .276 The
obligation to institute separate judicial proceedings would slow or even halt
expedited litigation where speed is of the essence.
Section 420(1)(a) would limit foreign disclosure requests to "directly
relevant, necessary and material" information, rather than extending access
to all non-privileged relevant material. The commentary would also require
that the information be admissible, noting that these restrictions are due to
"the degree of difficulty in obtaining compliance, and the amount of resist-
ance to the United States ordered discovery that has developed in foreign
states. 
' 277
The Draft Restatement deals with potential "overreaching" by the
United States in part by adopting a "center of gravity" test to determine
which nation's privilege law should be applied.278 While the reporters seem
to favor interpreting fact situations so that conduct is deemed to take place
in the United States and this country's privilege laws apply, 279 the Draft
itself could allow significant United States securities activities to escape
regulation because the communications involved are "centered ' 28 in
another country. Unlike Section 40 of the current Restatement, which
requires each nation involved in a conflict to "consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction," the language of the
Draft seems to defer to a conflicting foreign law rather than United States
law.
28 1
274. The courts have recognized that federal agencies do consider these matters. See United
States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. at 1162-63 ("the fact that this action was brought by
the government ... weighs heavily towards finding a strong American interest in obtaining the
information sought").
275. Draft Restatement § 420 reporters' note 8 notes that private parties' requests for foreign
document production require closer scrutiny than those of the United States government, but
the Section nonetheless would require government agencies to obtain a court order. The
reporters believe that "this may lead to more careful consideration of a request for information
within the executive branch, including consideration of alternative means of obtaining the
desired information."
276. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); Pacific States Box &
Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491
F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
379 F.2d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
277. Draft Restatement § 420 comment a.
278. Id. § 419 reporters' note 2; see id. § 420 comment c ("the privilege would ordinarily be
determined by the law of the state where the subject of the communication is centered.").
279. See, e.g., Draft Restatement § 419 reporters' note 5 (advocating broad application of
United States law to acts done both abroad and in the United States).
280. See supra note 278.
281. For example, although Draft Restatement § 420(2)(c) allows adverse findings to be
made against a party as a sanction for refusal to comply with a legitimate request for disclosure,
the commentary notes that
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The commentary to Section 420 suggests that disclosure "without court
intervention" would still be an option if the parties agree, but out-of-court
agreements would likely be rare under Section 420.282 The Commission has
received information from Switzerland through an individual waiver of bank
secrecy, but under unusual circumstances. 2
83
4. Policies are Unwarranted Departure from Current Law
The changes from current law made by Section 420 are based in part on
incorrect assumptions. The drafters erroneously believe (1) that there is a
substantive conflict of laws warranting modification of United States rules,
and (2) that United States law should be more generous in its accommoda-
tion of conflicting foreign law.
The notes and comments to Section 420 concern substantive conflicts of
law which have arisen principally in the antitrust and maritime areas.284 The
foreign statutes involved in securities cases generally present no substantive
conflict with American securities law. 285 Therefore, it is inappropriate to
make changes in an area which has not generated the problems to which
these changes are addressed.
While foreign nations may at times resist United States requests for
information due to differing systems for pretrial disclosure,286 that alone
does not justify blanket restrictions on access to information located abroad
when a case has properly been brought in the United States. 287 The Report-
[sluch a finding is appropriate only if there is reason to believe that the information, if
disclosed, would be adverse to the non-complying party, and if the court is satisfied that the
request was made in good faith, not in hope that the opposite party's non-compliance
would enable the requesting party to establish a fact that it could not establish if all the
information were available.
Id. § 420 comment e. See also id. § 419 comment e (application of French law in Fruehauf/
France case in actions in France and in the United States).
282. Compare Draft Restatement § 420 comment a ("nothing in this section prevents parties
from agreeing to make disclosure") with Bank of Nova Scotia 11, 722 F.2d at 658 (difficulties
with settlement in case involving production of documents pursuant to grand jury subpoena).
283. See, e.g., SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies: Hearings Before the Perm.
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 325-28 (1983) (Statement of Commission Enforcement Director John M. Fedders)
(discussing Swiss government cooperation in the 1977 Treaty and 1982 Memorandum of
Understanding, but noting further need for a general solution, rather than one employed on a
case-by-case basis).
284. See Draft Restatement § 420 reporters' note 1.
285. Blocking and secrecy statutes do not endorse and encourage fraud, misrepresentations,
or manipulation. Thus, there is no substantive conflict as in the income tax, antitrust, or
maritime law areas. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
286. Draft Restatement § 420 reporters' note 1; see Feliciano v. Reliant Tool Co., 691 F.2d
653, 657 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1982) ("the free wheeling discovery common in American litigation is
disfavored in most foreign countries").
287. See Bank of Nova Scotia III, slip op. at 14 (foreign government requested showing of
relevance, competence, and admissibility of information subpoenaed by grand jury before
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ers state that Section 420 "generally supports the United States position"
that persons who do business in the United States are subject to United
States discovery laws, "subject . . .to the principle of reasonableness." 288
But the inflexible strictures of Section 420 do not generally support the
United States position.
As a result, the Draft Restatement would require a retreat from the
current broad prophylactic coverage of the securities laws. Effective en-
forcement of the securities statutes would be undermined if persons could
avoid compliance with information requests or legitimate disclosure re-
quirements imposed by United States law merely by effecting securities
transactions through foreign intermediaries who can invoke secrecy or
blocking statutes. 289 The Draft Restatement could thus impede evolving
transnational commerce, by making it more difficult to hold wrongdoers
accountable for their conduct.
B. DRAFT RESTATEMENT SECTION 431
Draft Restatement Section 431290 concerns transnational use of United
States jurisdiction to enforce. 29' In general, enforcement outside the United
States is permitted only after notice and hearing, absent an exigency or
urgency.292 This' requirement is in addition to similar due process rules
under the United States Constitution. 293 The goal of the Draft Restate-
ment's requirements is to allow exercise of enforcement jurisdiction only
where it is not arbitrary.294
Several provisions in the securities laws now allow ex parte action by the
Commission. For example, the Commission, when appropriate, may sum-
marily suspend trading in securities for a period not exceeding ten days,
pursuant to Securities Exchange Act Section 12(k).295 This provision is
exemption from blocking statute would be permitted; held that accession to such a request
would violate United States' traditional secrecy of grand jury deliberations).
288. Draft Restatement § 420 reporters' note 1.
289. Courts have clearly indicated that this was not Congressional intent as a matter of
domestic law. See Sec v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977),
quoted supra note 58; SEC v. Banca della Sviszzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 114, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), quoted supra note 254.
290. See supra note 1.
291. Jurisdiction to enforce is distinct from jurisdiction to prescribe, which has been dis-
cussed up to this point. See Draft Restatement § 401. Exercise of jurisdiction to enforce
depends on the existence of proper jurisdiction to prescribe. Id. § 431(1).
292. Id. § 431(2) and comment d(iii), which uses the terms "exigency" and "urgent action."
293. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (prejudgment
garnishment requires notice and prior hearing). Draft Restatement § 431 comment f notes that
the section "does not, of course, confer authority on agencies of the enforcing state to exceed
their powers under domestic law."
294. Draft Restatement § 431 comment d.
295. 15 U.S.C. 781(k). Each suspension requires a new finding of necessity. See SEC v.
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
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generally used where it appears to the Commission that material informa-
tion is not available to the public. Similarly, the Commission has authority
under Securities Act Rule 261(a) to summarily and temporarily suspend any
Regulation A exemption from the registration requirements of the Secu-
rities Act, if it appears to the Commission that the issuer or its predecessors,
promoters, officers, directors or underwriters engaged in certain conduct. 
296
The commentary to the Draft Restatement suggests that these actions by
the Commission would be covered by Section 431.297 And there is no
indication that the conditions which permit Commission action are consid-
ered "exigent" under Section 431. The only examples of "exigency" given
by the drafters are halting a departing planeload of narcotics or the import of
impure drugs. 298 However, the Commission's summary powers are impor-
tant in maintaining an effective and orderly securities market, even though
the purchase of a security without the safeguards of the summary provisions
of the federal securities laws may not reach the level of exigency suggested
by the drafters. The ability to prevent harmful or illegal activity is integral to
the structure and enforcement of federal securities regulation.
Conclusion
The Draft Restatement would drastically and undesirably change current
law as it affects the work of the Commission in two major areas. First, in the
area of jurisdiction to apply United States law, the Draft Restatement would
replace settled law with vagueness and uncertainty and would severely
curtail application of United States law to transnational securities activities.
The Draft Restatement adds new and uncertain provisions, tilted against
application of our nation's law, even in circumstances where United States
law would unquestionably be applicable now. There have been no abuses
that justify such a radical departure from current law concerning trans-
national securities law jurisdiction. In contrast to the Draft Restatement,
Section 1905 of the Federal Securities Code, the provision in an already-
approved proposal by the ALI concerning the same subject, restates current
law and practice. Second, in the area of enforcement, procedures, and
sanctions, the Draft Restatement imposes new procedural requirements
which would inhibit the production of information located abroad. This
could preclude effective and evenhanded enforcement of the securities laws.
The Draft Restatement would also make it more difficult for the Commis-
sion to take summary action which may be necessary for the protection of
securities markets in the United States.
296. 17 C.F.R. 230.261(a). Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. 230.251.264, is an exemption from
registration for small issues. See Securities Act Rule 254, 17 C.F.R. 230.254.
297. "[S]uspension . . . of a permit to engage in a particular business activity" is one
enforcement measure intended to be within the scope of this provision. Draft Restatement
§ 431 comment a.
298. See id. § 431 comment d(iii).
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